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ABSTRACT
By matching a CEO’s place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S.
Census survey data, I obtain an estimate of the CEO’s family wealth and study the
link between the CEO’s endowed social status and firm performance. I find that, on
average, CEOs born into poor families outperform those born into wealthy families,
as measured by a variety of proxies for firm performance. There is no evidence of
higher risk-taking by the CEOs from low social status backgrounds. Further, CEOs
from less privileged families perform better in firms with high R&D spending but they
underperform CEOs from wealthy families when firms operate in a more uncertain
environment. Taken together, my results show that endowed family wealth of a CEO
is useful in identifying his or her managerial ability.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
A growing literature in finance and economics shows that CEOs can significantly
influence strategic firm decisions and performance (see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar
(2003); Bennedsen et al. (2007); Perez-Gonzalez (2006)). Further, a large part of
the variation in CEOs’ management style is explained by their personal traits and
characteristics (Malmendier and Tate (2008); Kaplan et al. (2012)). Given the high
cost of replacing a CEO, selecting the most talented CEO is of first-order importance
for shareholders. Therefore it is essential to identify the personal characteristics of a
firm’s leader that translate into greater firm success.
In this study, I examine how a CEO’s family social status in his or her forma-
tive years is associated with managerial ability demonstrated later in life. Evidence
from economics and psychology research suggests that endowed social status has
long-lasting effects on the behavioral and economic outcomes of individuals, such as
propensity to obtain higher education and accumulate wealth (see, e.g., Bowles et al.
(2001); Domhoff et al. (2013)). Further, the behavior and economic outcomes of chil-
dren are strongly correlated with those of their parents (Blau and Duncan (1967);
Solon (1992); Zimmerman (1992); Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998)). I therefore hypoth-
esize that family background of a future CEO may be helpful in explaining the CEO’s
professional performance and management style. One reason to expect a relation is
that the barriers to securing a prestigious job are significantly higher for individuals
of lower social status (Rivera (2016); Domhoff et al. (2013)) so that only the most tal-
ented or the most hard-working among those individuals succeed in becoming CEOs.
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The selection mechanism suggests a negative relation between CEOs’ endowed social
status and their managerial performance.1
On the other hand, a large literature in psychology suggests that people having
high social status tend to develop valuable social connections in schools, prestigious
clubs and work environments (see, e.g., Levine and Rubinstein (2017); DiMaggio and
Garip (2012); Burt (1997); Lin (2000)). Social networks can add value to firms be-
cause they facilitate access to information and capital and may be a source of political
influence (Engelberg et al. (2012); Borisov et al. (2016)). Thus, based on the social
connections literature, I may expect a positive relation between a CEO’s endowed
social status and firm performance.
To study firm performance implications of CEOs’ endowed social status, I first of-
fer an empirical proxy for a CEO’s endowed social status and show that it is strongly
correlated with measures of barriers to entry to prestigious careers. To obtain a proxy
for a CEO’s endowed social status, I estimate the CEO’s family wealth at the time
he or she graduated from high school. I use a sample of all active CEOs of S&P 1,500
firms between 2004 and 2009 and collect their birth dates and parents’ names from
the Marquis Who’s Who (R) Biographies on Lexis-Nexis database. I then use the
CEOs’ birth certificates and high school yearbooks to identify their places of birth
and the names and locations of the high schools they attended. The CEO’s family
wealth is estimated as the median household income in the neighborhood where the
1Individuals from wealthy families can rise to prestigious positions with the help of their inherited
wealth, for example, heirs of family-controlled firms face relative lower barriers to entry to leadership
positions than other candidates. Perez-Gonzalez (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) suggest that
family-controlled firms tend to promote CEOs based on family ties rather than on merit and inherited
control is associated with poor firm performance. In contrast, Mehrotra et al. (2013) find that
Japanese family firms managed by non-blood heirs selected through adult adoptions or arranged
marriages are star performers. They argue that the non-blood heirs are selected for talent.
2
CEO lived at the time he or she graduated from high school. This procedure allows
me to obtain family wealth for 506 CEOs, who constitute my main empirical sample.
The estimated family wealth appears to be a reasonable proxy for a CEO’s en-
dowed social status. For example, I find that CEOs with lower family wealth are less
likely to attend expensive private high schools, go to college, attend an Ivy League
school, or obtain an MBA degree. Further, individuals with lower family wealth
have less access to professional and social networks, as measured by the number of
connections between the CEO and the members of the board of directors. I also
find that individuals born into poor families become CEOs when they are more than
six years older than individuals born into affluent families. This finding is consistent
with individuals from poor families facing greater barriers to entry to prestigious jobs.
My main empirical finding is that on average, CEOs born into poor families out-
perform those born into wealthy families. The results are robust to controlling for a
variety of CEO and firm-specific characteristics and also to using different measures
of firm performance, such as the firm’s operating return on assets, asset turnover,
earnings surprises, stock returns, and the number and quality of M&A deals com-
pleted during the CEO’s tenure in office. Further, for a subset of older CEOs, I
obtain a high-precision measure of family wealth available through the 1940 Individ-
ual U.S. Census. The results are robust to using this alternative measure of family
wealth, which indicates that measurement error is unlikely to taint my inference. The
negative relation between a CEO’s family wealth and performance is stronger in in-
dustries that allow for a high level of managerial discretion, in multi-segment firms,
and in growth firms, as proxied by high R&D spending and market-to-book ratios. I
next consider potential channels through which CEOs can affect firm performance. I
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find that the effect of a CEO’s endowed social status on firm performance is largely
driven by differences in the CEOs’ propensity to invest in human capital and develop
successful innovation. In particular, CEOs endowed with lower family wealth do not
lay off as many people when their firms’ financial health temporarily deteriorates.
Greater employee job security is conducive to a corporate culture of more integrity,
and it motivates employees to invest more in firm-specific human capital and take on
more innovative projects, which could be beneficial to firm shareholders. For exam-
ple, Edmans (2011) finds that firms that treat their employees better tend to have
higher stock returns.
I also consider the relation between a CEO’s endowed family wealth and firm per-
formance during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. I find that CEOs with
a higher family wealth tend to perform better when their businesses face a significant
amount of uncertainty. In another set of tests, I find that the better performance of
CEOs from wealthy families is stronger in firms that are financially constrained or
sensitive to political policy. The results lend support to the hypothesis that CEOs
from wealthy families have advantages that may stem from having access to financial
capital and being politically connected. Better access to information and valuable
social connections could translate into better decision-making during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty.
While my results are consistent with a view that on average, CEOs with a low
endowed social status are able to create more value for their shareholders, there are
several potential alternative explanations. First, there could be a systematic link
between family wealth and the types of firms run by the CEOs.
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To address such concern, I compare the profitability of firms run by the CEOs
with high and low family wealth in the year before those CEOs joined their firms and
do not find significant differences. However, it is also possible that the observed nega-
tive relation between a CEO’s family wealth and firm performance arises because the
CEO’s place of residence is correlated with unobservable CEO characteristics (see,
e.g., Jokela et al. (2014)). For example, CEOs who choose to live in relatively poor
neighborhoods may be more entrepreneurial, risk-loving, open to new experiences,
or very introverted, and these personality traits may be correlated with firm perfor-
mance (Gow et al. (2015)). To alleviate this concern, I use an instrument for family
wealth, which measures the per capita economic losses caused by natural disasters in
the counties of CEOs’ places of residence in their formative years. The identifying
assumption is that natural hazards affect family wealth but are not fully anticipated
by a CEO’s family, and therefore are unlikely to be related to personal characteristics.
As expected, the economic losses from natural disasters are significantly negatively
correlated with the CEO’s family wealth. Further, the negative relation between
the CEO’s family wealth and firm performance is robust when I use the instrument.
This result is consistent with the view that the barriers to securing a CEO position
are higher for less privileged candidates and that only the most talented individuals
among them succeed. Further, I use the test proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) and
developed by Oster (2017) to estimate the degree of omitted variable bias needed to
explain the observed coefficients. I find that selection on unobservable variables has
to be three to eighteen times as large as selection on observable variables in order to
explain away the observed negative relation between CEOs’ family wealth and firm
performance. Given that my regressions already control for many determinants of
firm performance, the selectivity bias is unlikely to affect the inference.
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Another potential explanation for my results is that CEOs born into poor fam-
ilies do not have greater ability or effort, but instead pursue more risky investment
strategies, take on more leverage, or are more aggressive in financial reporting. If risk-
taking is positively correlated with firm performance, it could explain the observed
negative relation between family wealth and performance. However, the conjecture
that executives born into poor families take more risk is not supported by the data.
Firms run by CEOs from poor families have similar leverage and a similar propensity
to commit accounting fraud and to become a target of shareholder litigation as firms
run by their peers from wealthy families.
In my final analysis, I examine why CEOs from wealthy families are selected by
the board if they are, on average, underperform CEOs born into poor families. It
is possible that board members are not able to gain a complete picture of a CEO’s
quality at the time he or she is selected and a better-connected candidate (i.e., an
individual from a wealthy family) is more likely to be selected as a CEO because
connections catalyze information flow. I find evidence consistent with this view. Un-
derperforming CEOs from wealthy families are less likely to be selected by a board
when there is more public information available about his or her past performance.
My study adds to a growing literature in corporate finance that emphasizes the
influence of a CEO on firm performance and shows how managerial attributes and
individual life experiences can have a large influence on firm decisions and outcomes
(see, e.g., Bertrand and Schoar (2003); Bennedsen et al. (2007);Malmendier and Nagel
(2011); Warner et al. (1989); Perez-Gonzalez (2006); Weisbach (1995)). I contribute
to this literature by documenting that the endowed social status of a CEO is one
important determinant of his or her on-job performance. My paper is also related to
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the literature on the effect of family background on individual economic outcomes.
For example, Chetty et al. (2014) find that a child’s access to higher-quality primary
school is associated with higher college attendance and later outcomes.
The work most closely related to my study is Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018), who
use the 1940 Census data for individuals born before 1945 to analyze the relation be-
tween endowed family wealth and professional performance of mutual fund managers.
Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) find that mutual fund managers born into poor fami-
lies deliver higher risk-adjusted returns than managers born into wealthy families. In
contrast, my study focuses on CEOs of large public firms, who may need a different
set of skills for success. In contrast to fund managers in financial firms who have
the principal authority in managing fund’s portfolio, CEOs from wealthy families
may have an advantage in access to financial capital and benefit from the influence
that stem from their political connections. Further, I show that CEOs from wealthy
families perform better than their peers from less privileged families during periods
of high economic policy uncertainty. The findings are consistent with the view that
CEOs from wealthy families have better access to information and develop better
connections, which could translate into better decision-making when their businesses
face a large amount of uncertainty. Further, unlike Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018), my
analysis is not restricted to individuals born prior to 1945, which may be important
given the evidence of time trends in the correlation between wealth and access to
education for general population.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses literature and
motivates the link between CEO’s endowed family background and firm outcomes.
Chapter 3 describes data sources and sample construction. The main empirical anal-
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ysis is presented in Chapter 4. CEOs’ performance during periods of economic policy
uncertainty is studied in Chapter 5. Alternative explanations are examined in Chap-
ter 6. Chapter 7 discusses the mechanisms, Chapter 8 studies why underperforming
CEOs from wealthy families are selected, and Chapter 9 concludes.
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Chapter 2
MOTIVATION AND RELATED LITERATURE
My study lies at the intersection of the literature on economic inequality and the
corporate literature on CEO characteristics and firm outcomes. With respect to the
former, my focus is on a CEO’s endowed family background and his or her oppor-
tunities in career advancement. With respect to the latter, my study relates to the
large literature on CEOs’ managerial ability and style.
In contributing to the literature on economic inequality, my results complement
existing studies that explore whether endowed social status has long-lasting effects
on the behavioral and economic outcomes of individuals. For example, Chetty et al.
(2014) find that a child’s access to higher-quality primary school is associated with
higher college attendance and better later outcomes. Further, Black et al. (2005) and
Bowles et al. (2005) argue that individuals are endowed with different opportunities
at birth, and those born in poverty face limited access to receive good education and
advance careers during their formative years. Several studies in psychology suggest
that individuals from wealthy families are more likely to inherit wealth, to be mem-
bers of prestigious clubs, and to belong to valuable social networks, which should
make it easier to obtain employment conditional on having the same track record
as candidates from less privileged backgrounds. For example, Domhoff et al. (2013)
suggest that the unequal opportunities to receive elite education, to access to valuable
social networks, and asymmetrical political influence present numerous barriers for
individuals from lower social status to change the economic status. Further, Rivera
(2016) provides evidence that individuals from upper-class have advantages in the
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labor market. The experience of Howard Schultz, a CEO of Starbucks, and Frank C.
Sullivan, a CEO and Chairman of RPM International Inc., help to illustrate these
arguments. Schultz grew up in a relatively poor family; he was the first person in
his family to go to college. Later he worked as a salesman and then joined Starbucks
when it was a start-up. He thrived in the business by virtue of his talent and hard
work and became the CEO of Starbucks at the age of 55. In comparison, Frank C.
Sullivan had a privileged upbringing. At the age of 41 he succeeded his father as the
third CEO of RPM International Inc., which was by then a $2 billion company.
In empirical methodology, my approach is similar to the literature that measures
experience effects among individuals. Using data of Swedish twins, Cronqvist and
Siegel (2015) find that socioeconomic status of an individual’s parents is associated
with his or her future savings behavior. Cronqvist et al. (2015) document that an
individual’s investment style has a biological basis. The idea that exposure to a par-
ticular experience has an effect on a CEO’s managerial style and corporate policies
is supported by a large number of studies in finance. This literature focuses on the
correlation between CEOs’ responses and shocks and find evidence of long-lasting ef-
fects of major negative shocks on executives’ beliefs. For example, Malmendier et al.
(2011) show that CEOs who grew up during the Great Depression are averse to debt
and that military service is correlated with aggressiveness or risk-taking. Similarly,
Schoar and Zuo (2017) use a time-series pattern to investigate the impact of entering
the labor market in a recession on CEOs’ management style. Dittmar and Duchin
(2016) find that firms run by CEOs who experienced financial difficulties are more
conservative and hold substantially more cash. Dessaint and Matray (2017) find that
managers whose firms are located near a hurricane disaster area increase their cor-
porate cash holdings. Based on a theory in social psychology, I hypothesize that the
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socioeconomic environment in which a CEO grew up affects behavior, including his or
her management style. However, what specific effects it has on a CEO’s managerial
style is an empirical question. On one hand, CEOs from poor families may be more
conservative in making corporate decisions because they are more sensitized to risk.
Alternatively, it is possible that poverty experienced in childhood increases a CEO’s
ability to deal with difficult situations and better adapt to a changing business envi-
ronment. Such CEOs may develop a preference for more innovative projects and seek
excitement and risk. Therefore it is not ex ante clear how a CEO’s family background
is associated with his or her managerial style. I don’t find evidence of higher risk tak-
ing by CEOs from less privileged backgrounds. The results suggests that they are
better able to preserve the firm’s human capital during periods of financial distress
and demonstrate greater ability to develop successful innovation.
My results also contribute to the literature that links CEO characteristics to firm
outcomes. CEOs are arguably the single most influential individual in corporate
decision-making process. For example, Mackey (2008) measures the percentage of
the variance in firm performance explained by CEOs’ heterogeneity and finds that
the “CEO effect” is more important in explaining firm performance than industry
and firm effects. Hambrick and Quigley (2014) use a refined methodology to measure
the contribution of a CEO to firm performance and find that CEOs account for 35.5%
of firm outcomes. These results imply that CEOs have a significant impact on firm
performance. Indeed, CEO fixed effects explain a large part of the variation in cor-
porate outcomes; see for example, Bertrand and Schoar (2003). While their results
indicate the existence of a managerial “style” effect, they are silent on which specific
executive characteristics are critical for firm policies and performance.
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A growing literature seeks to identify the personal attributes of CEOs that are
important determinants of firm performance. Several studies have examined CEOs’
past experiences and credentials (Kaplan et al. (2012); Cai et al. (2015); Gow et al.
(2015); Benmelech and Frydman (2015)). For example, Gow et al. (2015) find that a
CEO’s personality traits are associated with firm performance. Benmelech and Fry-
dman (2015) study whether companies that have a CEO with a military background
perform better. They find that CEOs with a military background are less likely to
engage in fraudulent activity (perhaps because a military experience instills a greater
sense of ethics) and that they perform better during times of industry distress. Most
of these studies have focused on the role of CEOs’ past experience, which is subject
to selection issues. In contrast to previous work, I document how endowed family
background is useful in identifying a CEO’s managerial ability and style. Different
from the literature studying how past experiences shape a CEO’s managerial ability
and behavior, my paper emphasizes the association between CEO characteristics and
managerial performance based on selection.
Finally, this study adds to the discussion of the role of networks in business. Sev-
eral studies suggest that individuals having higher social status are more likely to
belong to resource- and opportunity-rich social networks (see, e.g., DiMaggio and
Garip (2012); Burt (1997); Lin (2000)). Levine and Rubinstein (2017) find that most
entrepreneurs have valuable connections that allow for access to financial stability.
Hacker and Pierson (2010) indicate that higher social status is associated with greater
political influence. Individuals from the wealthy families can use their wealth and so-
cial connections to influence policy. Some managerial literature focuses on the effect of
social networks on corporate governance. Nguyen-Dang (2012) finds that CEOs with
external connections through cross-directorships are less likely to be fired following
12
poor performance. Hwang and Kim (2009) analyze the effect of social connections on
CEO compensation and find that CEO networks are a sign of bad governance. Social
networks can be beneficial to firms because they facilitate information flow and po-
litical influence. Engelberg et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms with connections to
banks enjoy reduced interest rate, which translates to better stock price performance.
Borisov et al. (2016) find a positive relation between firm value and political influence.
I complement their analysis of social networks in business by exploring the mecha-
nism by which CEOs from wealthy families outperform their peers from less wealthy
families during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. The empirical evidence
is consistent with the view that CEOs from wealthy families are more likely to obtain
valuable private information from their social connections, which could translate to
better decision-making.
This paper is closely related to a study by Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018), who use
1940 Census data for individuals born before 1945 to analyze the relation between
family wealth and professional performance of mutual fund managers. They find that
mutual fund managers born into poor families deliver higher risk-adjusted returns
than managers born into wealthy families. In contrast, my study focuses on CEOs of
large public firms, who may need a different set of skills for success, such as the abil-
ity to manage large groups of people, communicate effectively, and obtain valuable
information. CEOs from wealthy families may have an advantage in developing such
skills, which add value to the firm. Further, I find that CEOs born into wealthy fam-
ilies perform better than their peers from less wealthy families during periods of high
economic policy uncertainty. Environments perceived as highly uncertain are likely
to be viewed as very risky. Decision-making under uncertainty requires information
about the likelihood of alternative states, and how states and actions affect firm out-
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comes (Boyd (1990)). My results are consistent with the argument that CEOs from
wealthy families have better access to information and develop better connections,
which could translate into better decision-making when economic policy uncertainty
is high (see, e.g., DiMaggio and Garip (2012); Burt (1997); Lin (2000)). By exploring
the wealth performance relation under different economic environments, I document
that CEOs from wealthy families are valuable to firms during the periods of high
uncertainty.
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Chapter 3
DATA AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
3.0.1 Sample Construction
I start with a sample of all S&P 1,500 firms covered by the Standard and Poor’s
ExecuComp database for the period from 2004 to 2009. I exclude all regulated firms
(SIC codes 4900–4999) and firms that operate in the financial services industry (SIC
codes 6000–6999). I then identify all executives who have the entry “CEO” in their
“CEOANN” field and add those individuals who have “CEO” or “Chief Executive
Officer” in their “Annual Title” field in ExecuComp.1 All interim and acting CEOs,
as well as CEOs whose tenure is less than three years, are removed from the sample.
Next, I use company CUSIP and ticker to establish a match between the initial
sample of CEOs and the BoardEx database which contains detailed biographical in-
formation about executives. I screen these initial matches by requiring that executive
names match in the two databases. From the BoardEx database I obtain the CEO’s
date of birth, employment history, connections, educational institutions attended, and
degrees earned. When biographical data are not available in BoardEx, I use public
sources, such as Wikipedia and NNDB.
Using the CEO’s full legal name and age, I then merge with the Marquis Who’s
Who (R) Biographies on Lexis-Nexis database. The Lexis-Nexis database provides
the individual’s birth date and birth place. The output from the people search in
1I also manually examine other job titles for potential misclassification.
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the database also typically includes a list of associated people, such as parents and
spouse(s).
Finally, I search for the birth certificates and high school yearbooks of the CEOs
through the interface provided by ancestry.com. I first collect a CEO’s birth record
by using his or her full legal name and date of birth. This process may sometimes
generate multiple records for a search, especially for individuals with common first
and last names (e.g., Richard Anderson, the CEO of Delta Airlines). In such cases, I
also compare the state of birth and parents names listed on the birth certificate with
those provided in the Lexis-Nexis Public Records database. This procedure leaves
me with a sample of 601 unique CEOs of the 2,137 CEOs in the initial database. 2
I further exclude CEOs that were raised outside the United States. Overall, I am
able to identify the birth records of 506 CEOs, and those CEOs constitute my main
sample.
3.0.2 Family Wealth Estimate Based on the CEO’s Place of Residence
I follow two steps to estimate a CEO’s family wealth. First, I extract the CEO’s
record of high school yearbooks and establish a unique match by using the full name,
as well as the year and place of birth. I am able to identify the high school name,
location, and the year of graduation for 358 out of 506 CEOs in my sample. For
these 358 CEOs, I then obtain the high school street address, zipcode, city name,
and county name at the time of the CEO’s graduation.3 The CEO’s family wealth
2The fraction of CEOs with available data is comparable to that reported in other similar studies.
For example, Bernile et al. (2017), who examine the effect of CEOs’ early life experiences on risk-
taking behavior, are able to find the birth places of approximately 31% of the CEOs in their sample.
3Most of the CEOs in my sample attend high school when they were 12 to 18 years old. If a
CEO attends a high school but does not obtain a high school diploma, I use the last known year of
school attendance.
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is estimated as the median household income in the neighborhood where the high
school is located. This information is available through U.S. Census of Population
and Housing at the Census Tract level, which is reported by the U.S. Census Bureau
every ten years. The reports include important statistics, such as total population
and household income, as well as various demographic and economic characteristics
at the tract, city, county, and state levels. I estimate a CEO’s family wealth at the
time of the CEO’s formative years using the median household income reported in the
closest U.S. Census of Population and Housing file for census tract that the CEO’s
high school was located. For example, I match the location of the high school to the
1960 U.S. Census File if the CEO graduated from the high school between 1956 and
1965.4
Second, for 148 CEOs with missing high school yearbooks, I assume they continue
to reside in their formative years in the same place they were born. This assumption
is reasonable because for CEOs for whom I observe both locations (place of birth and
location of high school), I find that the two locations coincide in 93% of cases. I then
match the location of their birth place to the nearest U.S. Census of Population and
Housing file following the same procedure as in the previous step.
3.0.3 Family Wealth Estimate Based on the 1940 Individual U.S. Census Report
To assess the accuracy of my estimates of family wealth, I cross check them with
the measures of actual family wealth available for a subset of older CEOs from the
1940 U.S. Census file for individuals. I also repeat the empirical analysis using these
alternative (higher precision) measures of family wealth.
4When census tract level household income data are not available, I substitute the city or county-
level statistics.
17
The availability of the individual household income data is guided by the disclosure
of individual census records.5 I follow Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) and match the
CEOs with their family’s record in the 1940 U.S. Census. This procedure necessarily
limits the sample to individuals born prior to 1940, which yields an initial sample of
123 unique CEOs. I then exclude from this sample 15 CEOs who were born outside
the United States because their families are not included in the U.S. Census. I further
require a match by the CEO’s parents, the CEO’s date of birth, and the place of birth.
These criteria generates a fairly good match because the census records identified in
this process for each CEO are unique. In this way, I am able to identify family records
for 108 CEOs. I then obtain from these records the information on the annual income
of the CEO’s father and mother, whether the family owned or rented home in 1940,
the monthly rent (if rented), and the approximate house value (if owned). I define
the household income as the sum of the father’s and the mother’s annual incomes
reported in the family records.
3.0.4 Descriptive Statistics and Validity Tests
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for CEO and firm characteristics in my
sample. The definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix C; the continuous
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles of the distribution. The av-
erage family wealth is $3,066 (in 1940 dollars), and the median is $2,590. The family
wealth estimates based on the 1940 Individual U.S. Census data are similar in mag-
nitude, but are highly skewed. The mean and median family wealth 1940 are $2,336
and $1,944, respectively. These summary statistics are comparable to the estimates
5The individual decennial census records can not be released until 72 years after when they were
collected and the 1940 U.S. Census is the most recent available record.
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by Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018), who use a similar procedure and report the aver-
age (median) annual income for the mutual fund managers’ fathers of $2,273 ($2,000)
in 1940. In Appendix D, I also show that estimated family wealth is positively and
significantly correlated with family wealth 1940 available through the individual U.S.
Census. Further, family wealth is positively correlated with several measures of edu-
cational attainment. The spatial distribution of CEOs’ family wealth is also plotted
in Figure 1.
The average CEO in my sample is 57 years old, and only 3.5% of CEOs are fe-
male. Approximately 11% of CEOs attended private high schools, 93% hold a college
degree, 29% attended an Ivy League school, 32% have an MBA degree, and 8% have a
doctorate degree.The firms in my sample are large, profitable, and mature (see Panel
B). For example, the average firm is 26 years old, has $ 11,253 million in annual sales
and more than 30,000 employees, and has an ROA of 0.15.
In Table 2, I compare the means of all variables for CEO characteristics with high
and low family wealth. Overall, CEOs raised in wealthy families tend to be younger
and are more likely to have attended a private high school and an Ivy League school.
Interestingly, female CEOs are also more likely to come from wealthy families, per-
haps because the barriers to entry to prestigious positions, such as CEOs of S&P
1,500 firms, are particularly high for females during this time period.
In my main analysis, I estimate a CEO’s family wealth as the median household
income in the neighborhood of the CEO’s place of residence in his or her formative
years. This estimation is imperfect and does not give me a direct measure of CEOs’
endowed family wealth. I attempt to validate this measure (family wealth) in several
19
ways. First, I verify that it is positively and significantly correlated with the mea-
sure of CEO family income obtained from the 1940 U.S. Census report (family wealth
1940 ). For example, Table A1 in Appendix D shows that the correlation between the
two measures is 0.33, and it is significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
Second, family wealth is positively correlated with CEOs’ education. CEOs with high
family wealth are more likely to attend private high schools, obtain a BA degree and
attend an Ivy League school. All of these correlations suggest that family wealth is
a reasonable measure of CEO endowed social status, and that low family wealth is
likely to proxy for barriers to entry to prestigious jobs.
Third, I plot the spatial distribution of CEOs’ family wealth in the Unites States
(see Figure 1). CEOs with family wealth above the annual median are indicated
with red dots in the figure, and those with family wealth below the annual median
are indicated with blue stars. Chetty et al. (2014) argue that geography matters
for intergenerational mobility in the United States and show that it is less likely for
individuals to climb the income ladder in the Southeast and Midwest of the United
states. However, the intergenerational mobility tends to be high among the North-
east and West, such as New York, Boston, California and Seattle. It can be seen
from Figure 1 that more CEOs in my sample grew up in the East of the United
States. CEOs from wealthy families are more likely to be from the northeast area,
e.g., New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, whereas the distribution of CEOs
from poor families is more evenly dispersed across the country. CEOs from poor fam-
ilies tend to grow up in areas with few opportunities and low mobility, and they are
at a disadvantage to obtain prestigious education and connect with influential people.
Fourth, I collect the CEOs’ employment history from different sources, includ-
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ing the LinkedIn, Bloomberg, Forbes, and BoardEx databases. I obtain information
about the different companies in which a manager worked over his or her career, the
position(s) held in each firm, and the dates of employment. If my measure of family
wealth indeed proxies well for the endowed social status of a CEO, I should expect
the CEO’s family wealth to be correlated with measures of barriers to entry to presti-
gious careers. For example, CEOs from wealthy families may be more likely to inherit
greater wealth, be members of prestigious clubs, and belong to the social networks
of their parents, and thus more likely to start their professional careers earlier. The
analysis of CEOs’ career paths and social networks generally supports this conjecture
(see Panel B of Table 2). On average, the CEO from a wealthy family starts his or
her first job at the age of 26, whereas the CEO from a poor family starts at the age
of 27. I find that the age gap between CEOs from wealthy and poor backgrounds
becomes bigger as the positions become more prestigious. For example, individuals
with high family wealth become CEOs when they are 47 years of age, as compared
with 53 for individuals with low family wealth.
A similar picture emerges when I look at the CEOs connections to firm directors.
Individuals from wealthier families are more likely to develop valuable connections,
which could make it easier for them to obtain employment conditional on having the
same track record as candidates from less privileged families. I construct several prox-
ies of network connections between directors and the CEO: (1) prior employment–i.e.,
directors and CEOs have overlapping prior employment in the same company; (2) ed-
ucation–i.e., directors and CEOs are alumni of the same school and graduated within
one year of each other; and (3) social activities–i.e., connections between directors
and the CEO through shared membership in other organizations with active partic-
ipation in the organization. I sum the number of connections between directors and
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the CEO and calculate the percentage of directors who are connected to the CEO for
each fiscal year in my sample. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 2. CEOs
from poor families are more likely to have worked with the directors of their firms in
the past, which may indicate that they are more likely to get promoted from inside
the firm rather than be hired in the capacity of CEO from outside. In contrast, CEOs
from wealthy families are more likely to be connected to firm directors through prior
education and social activities.
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Chapter 4
FAMILY WEALTH AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
4.0.1 Main Results
I analyze whether a CEO’s endowed family wealth is related to his or her ability
to create value for shareholders. I estimate this relation via panel OLS regressions.
All specifications include industry and year fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity across industries and time. Specifically, I estimate the following model
yi,t = µt + γk + β ∗ family wealthj + δ ∗Xj,t + θ ∗ Zi,t + i,t, (4.1)
where index t refers to time, i to firms, j to CEOs, and k to industries (defined by
two-digit SIC codes). Variable yi,t is the measure of a firm’s performance, family
wealthj is the measure of the CEO’s family wealth in his or her formative years, Xj,t
is a vector of personal CEO characteristics, such as female indicator, prior industry
experience, prior CEO experience, BA degree, MBA degree, and PhD degree, and Zi,t
is a vector of firm characteristics that includes firm size, market-to-book ratio, lever-
age, firm age, R&D expenses, capital expenditures, and firm governance variables
(CEO-chair, board size, and board independence). The definitions of all variables are
provided in Appendix C. In all specifications, the standard errors are clustered by the
firm.1
Following the extensive corporate literature, I use the operating return on assets
(ROA) as my main measure of firm performance. This variable is calculated as the
1My results are robust if instead I cluster the standard errors by the executive.
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ratio of operating income to the book value of assets. One advantage of using ROA is
that it captures the current profitability of the firm, but is not affected by the firm’s
capital structure decisions (Denis and Denis (1995); Hochberg and Lindsey (2010)).
As additional measures of firm performance, I use asset turnover, calculated as the
firm’s sales divided by the book value of assets (Schoar and Zuo (2017)), stock return,
and the number and quality of M&A deals announced during the CEO’s tenure in
office (Malmendier and Tate (2008)).
Table 3 shows the results of the estimation using ROA. As controls, I first include
only firm characteristics, then add CEO characteristics, and finally add corporate
governance variables. Most control variables enter with expected signs. For example,
larger firms, firms with low leverage, and firms with high capital expenditures are
more profitable. In contrast, firms that do R&D have lower profitability, perhaps be-
cause the research and development costs have to be expensed in the current period
under the U.S. accounting rules, while they may represent the firm’s investment for
the long term. In my sample, CEOs born into poor families are older than CEOs
from wealthy families. It is possible that CEOs from poor families have better per-
formance because they are more experienced than their peers from wealthy families.
I, therefore, control for the CEO’s past work experience in the same industry (two-
digit SIC code) and his or her past CEO experience. Most CEO and firm governance
characteristics are not significantly related to firm performance.
Both measures of a CEO’s endowed social status, family wealth and high family
wealth, are negatively related to the operating return on assets, with the coefficients
being statistically different from zero. The results also appear to be economically
important. For example, the coefficient on family wealth of −0.022 in the first spec-
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ification implies that a one standard deviation increase in family wealth translates
into a 0.009 decrease in the firm’s ROA, which corresponds to a 6.0% decline rela-
tive to the mean ROA of 0.15. The estimation with a high family wealth indicator
yields similar results. Overall, my results suggest that CEOs from wealthy families
underperform those from poor families. Further, I construct an alternative measure
of family wealth which is estimated as the median household income reported in the
closest U.S. Census of Population and Housing file for the city that the CEO’s high
school was located. In Table A3, I find that the estimate of a CEO’s family wealth
is strongly negatively associated with firm performance. The coefficients on family
wealth remain statistically significant at the conventional level, and the magnitudes
are similar to those in Table 3 across all specifications.
While certainly suggestive, this evidence is insufficient to draw a causal conclu-
sion. In fact, several alternative explanations for the existence of a relation between
CEO’s measured family wealth and firm performance are possible. First, it could
be that CEOs from families with different social status join different types of firms
(selection on observable and unobservable variables). Alternatively, some omitted
variables (e.g., CEO characteristics) could drive firm performance and be correlated
with the CEOs’ family wealth. Second, it could be that the measurement error in my
explanatory variable affects the inference. Third, it is possible that CEOs endowed
with different social status do not have different ability or exert different amount
of effort, but rather they have different styles. For example, the negative relation
between CEO’s family wealth and firm performance could arise if CEOs from poor
families systematically choose more risky financing policies and investment strategies
(that tend to be more profitable), or if they are more aggressive in financial report-
ing. I address these and other related issues in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. In the next
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section, I discuss the measurement error in my variable and also present results that
rely on a more precise measure of family wealth.
4.0.2 Empirical Analysis Based on the 1940 U.S. Census Income Data
In this section, I address a potential concern that a CEO’s family wealth based on
the place of residence is measured with error. If the true measure of family wealth is
uncorrelated with the regression residual, then the estimated coefficient on the noisy
proxy of family wealth that I observe will be attenuated. Therefore, I will tend to
underestimate the effect of family wealth on firm performance. To examine this issue
more directly, I analyze a smaller sample of 108 CEOs born before 1940 for whom a
highly reliable measure of family wealth is available through the 1940 Individual U.S.
Census. If indeed my results are affected by the measurement error in family wealth,
I should expect to see a more pronounced relation between a highly precise measure
of a CEO’s family wealth and firm performance.
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation in this limited sample. Notably, the
negative relation between a CEO’s family wealth and the firm’s ROA is observed in
all specifications. The point estimates are very similar to those reported in Table 3.
For example, the point estimate of -0.027 in column 1 of Table 4 can be compared to
-0.022 in the corresponding column 1 of Table 3. However, the economic magnitude
increases. Overall, these results suggest that while measurement error may cause me
to underestimate the true magnitude of the effect, it is unlikely to affect my results
to a large extent.
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4.0.3 Alternative Measures of Firm Performance
In this subsection, I consider some alternative measures of firm performance. In
the original tests, I focus on the operating ROA, which is less subject to accounting
manipulation. The results remain almost identical if I repeat my earlier tests using
an alternative measure of ROA defined as earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization scaled by total assets.
Next, I estimate a firm’s performance on generating revenues; I use asset turnover
as the measure of the firm’s efficiency in deploying its assets to generate revenue.
The results for this measure are reported in Table 5 and confirm the negative relation
between a CEO’s endowed family wealth and firm performance. Following Livnat and
Mendenhall (2006), I also use the standardized earnings growth as the measure of firm
performance. Earnings surprise is calculated from the Compustat database and is de-
fined as earnings per share before extraordinary items minus adjusted earnings per
share in the last period, scaled by the price per share. The empirical results suggest
a negative relation between the family wealth and earnings surprise. I next measure
firm performance using stock market performance–relative stock return which mea-
sures the firm’s abnormal return over the industry benchmark. Jenter and Kanaan
(2015) find that a large part of the variation in firm performance is explained by
factors beyond the CEO’s control. Their study suggests that a better measure of
firm performance (or CEO quality) should be the firm-specific component of firm
performance only. Following their methodology, I decompose firms’ stock market
performance into a peer-firm performance component and a firm-specific component.
Peer-firm performance is defined as the value-weighted stock return for firms in the
same two-digit SIC category. The sample firm is excluded from its own industry
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benchmark. The firm-specific component of stock market performance is the residual
value estimated from regressing the firm’s gross return on the peer firms’ return. The
results presented in Table 5 show a negative relation between a CEO’s family wealth
and the firm’s stock market performance. The evidence supports the argument that
the high performance of CEOs from poor families is not attributable to industry shock
or pure “luck”.
In addition, I study the CEOs’ performance on investment activities–i.e., mergers
and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions are a good setting in which to examine a
CEO’s ability to identify and negotiate good deals. To conduct these tests, I identify
merger deals announced between 1992 and 2015 in which the target is a publicly
listed firm in the United States. I exclude spin-offs, buybacks, self-tenders, exchange
offers, and repurchases. My sample ends up with 1,319 merger announcements. I
next estimate several regressions in order to study whether the CEO’s family wealth
has an impact on firm acquisition activities and performance. Industry and year fixed
effects are included in all models. Standard errors are clustered at the acquiring firm
level. The results are presented in Table 6.
Columns 1 through 4 display the model estimation for the relation between a
CEO’s family wealth and the number of announced acquisitions. Across all four
specifications, the effect of a CEO’s endowed family wealth on firm acquisition ac-
tivities is statistically significant. Specifically, in model 4, the estimates imply that
CEOs born into wealthy families tend to make 0.06 more M&A deals that their peers
from poor families. Next I examine how the market reacts to the announcements
of deals. The dependent variable is the announcement CAR, calculated over the
trading days (-1,+1) around the deal announcement date using the market model.
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The OLS regression estimates for the relation between a CEO’s family wealth and
acquisition announcement CAR are reported in columns 5 to 8. I also include a vec-
tor control variable that measures factors affecting the merger outcomes such as the
natural logarithm of deal size, the target firm’s market-to-book ratio, cash merger,
friendly merger, tender offer, and diversifying merger (for brevity, these estimates are
not shown here). The evidence in column 8 indicates that the market reacts more
favorably to the deals announced by acquirers whose CEOs are from less privileged
families. Such deals earn 1.4% higher announcement returns.
The lower returns associated with CEOs endowed with high social status may be
due to their lack of expertise in target-specific business and it is hard for them to
realize synergistic gains when venturing into diversified acquisitions. Indeed, I find a
positive correlation between high family wealth and the diversifying merger indicator.
Moreover, in diversifying mergers, the merger announcements by acquirers with CEOs
who were born into wealthy families earn significantly lower announcement CAR; in
non-diversifying deals, however, the earnings of CEOs from wealthy families are not
significantly different from those of their peers from poor families.
4.0.4 Heterogeneous Effects
To further exploit the effects of wealth on performance, I consider whether the
relation between a CEO’s family wealth and firm performance varies in different en-
vironments.
I examine heterogeneity with respect to several firm characteristics by introduc-
ing a few interaction terms to the main analysis. Columns 1 to 5 of Table 7 present
the results of heterogeneous effects of a CEO’s family wealth on firm performance.
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The wealth-performance relation is stronger for diversified firms and firms with more
growth options. In columns 1 and 2, the coefficients of interaction terms suggest
that the effect of family wealth on performance is stronger in firms with high R&D
expenses and market-to-book. The interaction term coefficient in column 3 is signif-
icant at 5% and increases the unconditional effect more than threefold. The results
are consistent with the argument that diversified and high-growth firms are likely to
require a higher level of CEO-specific human capital and that a CEO’s talent is more
valuable in these types of firms.
Following the methods developed by Hambrick (1995) and Adams et al. (2005),
I compute the rating of managerial discretion for the selected industries (two-digit
SIC code industry) and further define a variable (High discretion industry) which
takes the value of one if the firm operates in an industry in the top 40% of the
distribution of the score of managerial discretion and equals to 0 if the firm belongs
to an industry in the bottom 40% of the same distribution. 2 Model 4 of Table 7
reports the results of interacting High-discretion industry with the measure of a CEO’s
family wealth. SIC industry dummies are omitted from the regressions to avoid the
possible multicollinearity with the industry ratings. Consistent with the idea that
the wealth effect is stronger in industries where the CEO is more influential and their
human capital is more valuable, I find a negative and significant coefficient on the
interaction term. Moreover, the negative relation between a CEO’s family wealth
and firm performance is weaker in firms with a larger board, perhaps because the
involvement of many executives in the decision-making process in these organizations
dilutes the CEO’s influence on firm strategy and performance.
2Following prior literature, I eliminate the firms in industries that rank from the 40th to the 60th
percentile of the distribution, because of the potential measurement error in managerial discretion
in such industries.
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Chapter 5
PERFORMANCE DURING PERIODS OF POLICY UNCERTAINTY
Individuals born into wealthy families are more likely to be members of prestigious
clubs and to belong to the social networks of their parents. These connections should
make it easier for them to obtain employment conditional on having the same track
record as candidates from less privileged backgrounds (see Rivera and Tilcsik (2016);
Rivera (2016)). Social ties between CEOs and board of directors of a firm can result
in agency conflicts and therefore be detrimental (Fracassi and Tate (2012); Hwang
and Kim (2009); Nguyen-Dang (2012)). However, social networks can be beneficial
to firms if they facilitate information exchange and political influence: for example,
contacts that can be sources of useful business relationships (e.g., clients, suppliers) or
sources of other economic benefits and resource exchange (e.g., personal and political
favors). Several studies in psychology suggest that people from wealthy families tend
to develop valuable connections (see, e.g., DiMaggio and Garip (2012); Burt (1997);
Lin (2000)). Access to valuable social networks may benefit individuals who become
influential corporate decision-makers.
Engelberg et al. (2012) demonstrate that firms with connections to capital sup-
pliers enjoy more favorable lending terms, improved credit ratings, and better stock
price performance. Boyd (1990) finds that among firms facing an uncertain business
environment, firms with more connections tend to perform better in terms of sales
improvements and return on equity. Decision-making under uncertainty requires in-
formation about the likelihood of alternative states, and how states and actions com-
bine to affect firm outcomes. CEOs from wealthy families are more likely to obtain
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valuable information from their social connections, which could translate into bet-
ter decision-making when a business is operating in an uncertain environment. To
evaluate this conjecture, I test whether there are differential effects on firm outcomes
during periods of economic policy uncertainty by CEO type.
My measure of economic policy uncertainty is the monthly index developed by
Baker et al. (2016) (BBD). The index is constructed as a weighted average of four
different components. The main component is derived from news discussing policy-
related uncertainty. The other three components capture tax policy uncertainty,
uncertainty about fiscal policy and uncertainty about future government spending.
The weights assigned to these components are 1/2, 1/6, 1/6, and 1/6 respectively. I
further annualized this index by taking the average of the monthly values within each
year. For example, for every firm i in year t, the annual policy uncertainty index is
defined as average of the monthly values of the index in the firm’s fiscal year ending
in t-1.
In Table 8, I refine the analysis by interacting the estimate of a CEO’s family
wealth with an indicator variable for whether the firm faces a more uncertain busi-
ness environment during the year. I classify the firm as operating under high policy
uncertainty when it is in the top 25% of the distribution of the BBD index for the
reporting periods. As Table 8 shows, the measure of high policy uncertainty is asso-
ciated with lower firm performance, but it is not statistically significant. Based on
the estimates in column 1, I find that the coefficient on the interaction term between
family wealth and high policy uncertainty is positive and significant, implying that the
negative wealth effect is weaker when firms face high policy uncertainty. In addition,
I find that the linear combination of the coefficient on family wealth and the inter-
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action term is -0.005, suggesting that a CEO’s endowed family wealth is negatively
associated with firm performance. Indeed, when I control for CEO characteristics
and board characteristics the linear combination of the coefficient on family wealth
and the interaction between family wealth and high policy uncertainty is positive, im-
plying that CEOs’ family wealth is positively associated with firm performance when
firms face a more uncertain environment. The finding of better performance by CEOs
from wealthy families stands when I control for board characteristics.
5.0.1 Constrained Firms vs. Unconstrained Firms
I further explore the mechanism by which CEOs from wealthy families outperform
their peers from less wealthy families during periods of economic policy uncertainty.
Several papers (e.g., Gilchrist et al. (2014); Arellano et al. (2010); Pastor and Veronesi
(2012)) have argued that policy uncertainty can cause credit markets to tighten and
increase the cost of external financing. Firms that are more financially constrained
more likely to forgo profitable investment projects when external financing becomes
more costly. CEOs from wealthy families are more likely to get a lower cost of debt
for firms to finance corporate investment from their social contacts (Engelberg et al.
(2012)). Hence, I expect the differential effects on firm outcomes during period of
high policy uncertainty by CEO type to vary with a firm’s financial constraint status.
To test this conjecture, I split the sample of firms in two based on the firms’ financial
constraint status, which is measured using the index developed by Hadlock and Pierce
(2010). The model in column 4 includes firms in the top 25% of the distribution of
the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index; the model in column 5 includes other firms
in the sample. Based on the estimates in column 4, I find that the coefficient on
the interaction term between family wealth and high policy uncertainty is positive
and significant and the linear combination of the coefficient on family wealth and
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the interaction term is 0.022. Column 5 reports the same analysis for unconstrained
firms. The coefficient on the interaction term between family wealth and high policy
uncertainty is positive but statically insignificant. The estimation results suggest that
CEOs’ endowed family wealth is positively associated with firm performance during
periods of high policy uncertainty, and the effect is stronger for financially constrained
firms.
5.0.2 Policy-Sensitive Firms vs. Policy-Neutral Firms
A large literature in corporate finance studies the effects of economic policy uncer-
tainty on firm outcomes (Durnev (2010); Gulen and Ion (2016); Jens (2017)). Akey
and Lewellen (2017) further examine how sensitivity to policy uncertainty affects per-
formance within the cross-section of firms. They classify firms into two categories:
firms that are highly sensitive to policy uncertainty and firms that are less sensitive
to policy uncertainty. Their empirical evidence suggests that policy sensitive firms
respond more strongly to the resolution of economic policy uncertainty than policy
neutral firms.
A firm more sensitive to economic policy uncertainty should place a higher value
on the influence or informational advantages that may stem from having connections
to government policy-makers. Evidence from several studies suggests that high social
status is associated with greater political influence. Individuals from the wealthy
families are more likely to influence policy by using their wealth and social networks
(Hacker and Pierson (2010); Gilens and Page (2014)). I therefore hypothesize that
CEOs from wealthy families have an information advantage over their peers from less
privileged families during periods of economic policy uncertainty among firms highly
sensitive to political policy.
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I first identify policy-sensitive firms. I define an indicator variable with a value
of one for firms that operate in industries with high lobbying expenditures. An in-
dustry is classified as policy sensitive if it is among the top 20 industries with the
highest lobbying expenses, as ranked by the Center for Responsive Politics from 1998
based on data from the Senate Office of Public Records. I next examine CEOs per-
formance during periods of economic policy uncertainty within the cross-section of
firms. Columns 6 and 7 of Table 8 report the results. Consistent with the view that
CEOs from wealthy families benefit from the influence and informational advantages
that stem from their political connections, I observe a positive relation between CEOs
endowed family wealth and firm performance during periods of economic policy un-
certainty in firms that belong to most policy-sensitive industries.
My results in this chapter suggest that, on average, a CEO’s endowed family
wealth is negatively associated with firm performance. However, CEOs from wealthy
families perform better than their peers from less privileged families during peri-
ods of high policy uncertainty. The result is consistent with the view that CEOs
from wealthy families have advantages in access to valuable information, which could
translate to better decision-making.
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Chapter 6
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
6.0.1 Omitted Variables
In this section, I investigate the validity of alternative explanations and the ro-
bustness of the empirical results to omitted variables. One concern is the potential
systematic link between U.S. regions and CEO’s performance. For example, certain
regions of the country have better economic growth or public education, this could
be associated with the CEO’s managerial ability. A related concern is that, the cost
of living in the U.S. can vary drastically from state to state. The barriers to securing
a prestigious job for individuals is linked to his or her relative wealth in formative
years. In my tests, I address these concerns by including in all models fixed effects for
the CEO’s state of residence during formative years, which absorb state-level time-
invariant factors. The evidence in Table A5 in Appendix D indicates that CEO’s
endowed family wealth is negatively associated with firm performance.
Another concern is the potential systematic link between family wealth and the
type of firm. Specifically, the observed firm performance might be attributed to
the allocation of CEOs to specific firms. To better investigate the link between
CEOs’ family wealth and firm performance, I examine firm characteristics around
CEO turnover events for both types of CEOs. I follow the CEO turnover literature
(e.g. Denis and Denis (1995); Huson et al. (2004); Bennedsen et al. (2007)) to identify
CEO turnover events. For each firm in year t, if the CEO does not hold the CEO
title in year t-1, I record a turnover event for that firm in year t. I exclude turnovers
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related to special corporate events, such as merger and acquisitions or spin offs. In
Table A6 of Appendix D, I report the firm characteristics at year t-1 for CEOs with
high family wealth and those with low family wealth for 331 CEO turnover events
in my sample. CEOs with high family wealth tend to join firms with high market
to book ratio and R&D expense, and low leverage. However, the mean differences in
firm size, profitability, and capital expenditures are not statistically significant. The
evidence supports the view that the two types of CEOs are allocated to observably
similar firms and the firm characteristics are unlikely to explain the performance dif-
ferential.
The other concern is the omitted variables that could drive firm performance and
be correlated with the CEO’s family wealth. For example, individuals from wealthier
families may genetically inherit certain skills from their parents, have better con-
nections and access to resources. However, all these effects would favor a positive
relationship between the endowed family wealth and performance and they are un-
likely to explain the results. To further alleviate potential concerns that unobservable
omitted variables drive my results, I follow the method developed by Altonji et al.
(2005) and Oster (2017) to evaluate the selectivity bias. Oster (2017) shows that
the omitted variable bias can be evaluated by examining coefficient stability and the
movements in R-squared with the inclusion of more control variables. She calculates
a metric for the selection on unobservables, δ, such that δ > 1 indicates that the
bias arising from the selection on unobservables cannot explain away the coefficient
of interest to zero. I use her developed estimator under the assumption of Rmax = 1
and Rmax = 1.3R˜ , where R˜ is the observed R-squared in the regression model. The
results for each model estimated in this section are shown in Table 9. For example,
column 1 suggests that in model 3 of Table 3, selection on unobservables would need
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to be 18.7 times as strong as selection on observables to account for the observed
negative relation between CEO’s family wealth and firm performance. δ in all specifi-
cations is greater than one, which is the bound value suggested by Oster (2017). The
results following this procedure indicate that any remaining omitted variables bias in
my model is relatively small, and the estimation satisfies the standard for robustness
proposed by Oster (2017).
6.0.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
Recent studies in geographic psychology demonstrate variation in commonly ob-
served personal traits of people living in different regions. For example, Jokela et al.
(2014) map the Big Five personality traits (extroversion, neuroticism, openness to
experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness) of 216 London neighborhoods; they
find that people high in openness to experiences tend to live in the city center and that
residents of East Ham and Hanwell are introverted. Further, Gow et al. (2015) mea-
sure the personality of CEOs and find positive associations between introversion and
disagreeableness and operating performance, and between introversion and growth.
Therefore, if a CEO’s place of residence during the formative years proxies for some
unobservable CEO characteristics that drive firm performance, the OLS estimates
will be inconsistent and the wealth effect will be overstated.
To understand whether an omitted variable that is correlated with the estimate
of CEO family wealth drives my results, I use an instrumental variables approach to
examine whether CEOs with low family wealth are able to perform better in the firm.
An ideal instrumental variable would be strongly correlated with the estimate of CEO
family wealth but unrelated to his or her ability. I use the per capita economic loss
caused by fatalities in the county where a CEO resided during his or her formative
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years. Intuitively, the per capita economic damage in one county is negative corre-
lated with the CEO’s family wealth, which is estimated from the median household
income in the neighborhood. However, the ability of a CEO appears to be uncorre-
lated with his or her disaster experience, suggesting that the economic loss caused by
a natural disaster might be a valid instrumental variable. Most events in a natural
disaster affect wealth, including some relatively common events such as windstorms,
thunderstorms, and floods, and some less common but more damaging events such
as earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, and fires. I focus on less frequent events such
as earthquakes, fires, and hurricanes because they are less likely to be anticipated
and they tend to have large economic damages. I use the natural logarithm of the
estimated per capita dollar economic losses related to natural disaster events in 2015
dollars as the instrumental variable for my analysis. My data source of natural dis-
aster events is from the United States Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database
(SHELDUS), which includes the date, location and relevant economic loss, recorded
at the county level from 1960 to 2010.
Using the disaster events database, I calculate the total per capita economic loss
related to crop and property damage from the natural disaster for each county-year.
Next, I match the disaster events with the U.S. Census of Population and Housing
file, from which I obtain the estimate of CEO family wealth. For example, the county-
level economic loss caused by natural disasters between 1971 and 1980 is matched to
the county-level median household income from the U.S. Census of Population and
Housing in 1980.
My model is estimated by the two-stage least squares (2SLS). The results are pre-
sented in Table 10. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates of the first- and second-
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stage regressions and include year and industry fixed effects (2-digit SIC code) and
all control variables from model 1 in Table 3. The estimation in columns 3-4 (5-6)
includes year and industry fixed effects and all control variables from model 2 (model
3) in Table 3. In the first stage, I see that the per capita economic damage caused by
natural hazard is negatively correlated with the estimate of CEO family wealth, as
suggested by the high t-statistics, R-squared, and F-statistics of weak identification
test. In the second stage, I observe a negative and statistically significant relation be-
tween the exogenous variation in a CEO’s family wealth and firm performance. The
results are similar using different sets of control variables. Overall, my results do not
support the view that CEO family wealth proxies for some unobservable firm or CEO
characteristics. Instead, the negative relation between CEOs’ family wealth and firm
performance is more consistent with the story that the barriers to a CEO position
are higher for less privileged candidates and that only the most talented individuals
succeed.
Overall, my results do not support the view that CEO’s family wealth proxy for
some unobservable firm or CEO characteristics. Instead, the negative relation be-
tween CEO’s family wealth and firm performance is more consistent with the story
that the barrier to CEO position is particularly higher for less privileged candidates
and only the most talented individual can succeed.
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Chapter 7
MECHANISMS
I next consider potential channels through which CEOs can affect firm performance.
I explore the impact that endowed family wealth can have on the management style
of executives when they become CEOs later in life. Prior research shows that CEOs’
management style explains a large part of the variation in firm outcomes (Bertrand
and Schoar (2003); Malmendier and Tate (2008)). I first examine whether CEOs
family background is associated with his or her risk-taking behavior. A potential
explanation for the observed wealth effect on firm performance is that CEOs born
into poor families do not have greater ability or effort, but instead pursue more risky
investment strategies, take on more leverage, or are more aggressive in financial re-
porting. If risk-taking is positively correlated with firm performance, it could explain
the observed negative relation between family wealth and performance. It is also
possible that CEOs born into poor families may be more conservative in making cor-
porate decisions because they are more sensitized to the risk. Thus it is not clear how
family background affects individual decision-making later in life.
Following the literature on CEO styles, I match the CEO’s family wealth to the
annual firm data for the time that the CEO was at the helm. I focus on the corporate
outcomes related to financial policies, as well as equity risk, shareholder litigation,
and earnings restatement. I regress firm outcomes on the CEO’s family wealth to test
whether decisions vary systematically. The results from these tests are presented in
Table 11. The correlation between family wealth and leverage is not significant. In
addition, I find that CEOs from less wealthy families are associated with significantly
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lower annualized stock return volatility and idiosyncratic stock volatility than their
peers born into wealthy families. Columns 4 and 5 report linear probability model
regression estimates for the relation between CEO family wealth estimates and the
propensity the CEO’s firm to become a target of shareholder litigation and to revise
financial statements. The firms with CEOs from poor families are not different from
CEOs from wealthy families in issuing earnings restatements or becoming a target of
shareholder litigation. The results are not supportive of the risk-taking hypothesis.
CEOs from less privileged social status do not have a higher tendency to engage in
risky business practices. Further, I plot the firm characteristics around CEO turnover
(see Figure 2).1 CEOs with family wealth above the annual median are indicated by
gray lines in the figure, and those with family wealth below the annual median are
indicated by blue lines. Year 0 refers to the year of a new CEO’s appointment. Figure
2 shows that CEOs from poor families tend to join highly leveraged firms, but firm
leverage decreases over the CEO’s tenure. The stock return volatility and idiosyn-
cratic stock return volatility of firms with CEOs from poor families are lower than in
firms with CEOs from wealthy families. In addition, firms with CEOs from poor fam-
ilies issue earnings restatements less frequently than firms with CEOs from wealthy
families. Firm characteristics around CEO turnover presented in Figure 2 are consis-
tent with the regression analysis reported in Table 11. Both suggest that CEOs from
lower social status do not have a higher tendency to engage in risky business practices.
Table 12 focuses on firms’ innovation and employee job security. I use patent
counts and citations as my main measures of innovation. My sample of U.S. patents
comes from Kogan et al. (2017) and consists of all utility patents issued by the U.S.
1The definitions of firm leverage, stock return volatility and idiosyncratic stock return volatility
are presented in Appendix C. In each year, the shareholder class action lawsuits is defined as the
average of lawsuits in past three years. Earnings restatement is defined in the same way.
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Patent and Trademark Office for the period 1926 to 2010. The first measure of in-
novation is the number of patent applied for by a firm in a given year. The second
measure of innovation is the total number of citations to the patents that a firm
applied for in a given year. Following Acemoglu et al. (2014), I end the sample pe-
riod in 2006 to address the time truncation problem of patent citations since patents
filed in a later time period naturally have fewer citations. Columns 1-4 examine
the relation between filed patents and citations and the family wealth of the CEO. I
add interaction terms between R&D expenses and CEO family wealth estimates. The
coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and statistically significant, suggest-
ing that firms operated by CEOs from less wealthy families are able to develop more
patentable innovations with a one standard deviation increase in R&D expenditure.
The estimations suggest that a CEO’s family wealth is associated with his or her
ability to produce innovation, which is consistent with the result that the negative
relation between CEOs’ family wealth and managerial performance is stronger for
R&D-intensive firms.
Next I investigate whether CEOs’ family background affects how they treat em-
ployees. Edmans (2011) documents that firms that treat their employees better, as
measured by the inclusion of a firm in ”The 100 Best Places to Work For” list, earn
higher risk-adjusted returns. Moreover, Bernstein et al. (2017) present evidence that
a negative shock to individual employees has a significant negative impact on firm in-
novation. Therefore I study the relation between a CEO’s family wealth and employee
turnover during times of distress. I construct a hiring rate variable for each firm as
Employee(t)−Employee(t−1)
Employee(t−1) following Bazdresch et al. (2014). Employee turnover is coded
as zero if the hiring rate is positive, and it takes the absolute value of the hiring rate
otherwise. I introduce an interaction between ROA(t-1) and the CEO’s family wealth
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in the estimation regression and present the results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 12.
CEOs from poor families are more likely to keep their employees than their peers
from wealthy families. They do not lay off as many people when the firm’s financial
health deteriorates. Greater employee job security is conducive to a corporate culture
of integrity, and it motivates employees to invest more in firm-specific human capital
and take on more innovative projects, which is beneficial to firm shareholders.
Taken together, the results suggest that firms with CEOs from less privileged
backgrounds are more likely to produce innovation. These CEOs are better at mak-
ing decisions under pressure and offer higher job security for employees, which is
viewed as intensifying a firm’s competitiveness by motivating employees and lowering
production costs.
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Chapter 8
ANALYSIS OF CEO SELECTION
If a CEO’s family wealth signals his or her managerial ability, does the board of
directors observe this signal and use it when selecting a CEO? Why do boards se-
lect CEOs from wealthy families if they, on average, underperform CEOs born into
poor families? To shed light on this question I start by investigating the factors that
affect a firm’s decision to hire a CEO. Empirical studies such as those by Parrino
(1997) and Heckman (2005) categorize succession outcomes based on whether the
newly appointed CEO is recruited internally or externally. They note that there is an
increasing trend to hire CEOs from outside the firm and attribute this fact to firms’
desire to make strategic changes and to pressure from regulators or institutional in-
vestors.
Social connections between directors and candidates play a more important role
in outside hiring than in inside hiring. Information asymmetry is greater when firms
recruit from external candidates. Networks ties tend to facilitate information flow
and reduce search costs. A well-connected candidate benefits from being a member
of a strong network and from sharing a network with board members. Thus, I hy-
pothesize that individuals from wealthy families are more likely to be selected when
firms recruit from external candidates. I identify internal and external CEO candi-
dates based on their profiles in BoardEx and record the CEO turnover events. Next, I
estimate a Probit regression with the dependent variable taking the value of one when
the new CEO is appointed externally and zero when the CEO is promoted internally.
The results in Table A7 suggest that CEOs from wealthy families are more likely to
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be recruited externally.
There are two potential explanations for the observed relation. First, direct con-
nections between a CEO candidate and board members might weaken corporate gov-
ernance.1 For example, individuals from wealthier families have better connections
to influential people (e.g., boards of directors) and access to resources, which should
make it easier for them to obtain employment conditional on having the same track
record as candidates from less privileged backgrounds.
Second, it is possible that board members are not able to gain a complete picture
of a CEO’s quality at the time he or she is selected, and they learn more about his
or her ability from public information over time (Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and
Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994)). A better-connected candidate (i.e., an individual
from a wealthy family) is more likely to be selected as a CEO because connections
catalyze information flow.
To study this question I examine whether a CEO candidate was connected to
members of the nominating committee of the board before being appointed to the
leadership position. The nominating committee is typically composed of three to
five board members who oversee the CEO succession process, review the candidates,
and provide advice throughout. Individuals connected to the nominating committee
members are more likely to obtain employment conditional on having the same track
record as other candidates. I create a dummy variable that equals one if a CEO is
connected to the nominating committee though prior education or employment expe-
1Nguyen-Dang (2012) find that socially connected CEOs are more likely to find new and better
employment after being dismissed, a result that is not due to CEO ability.
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rience. I control for this indicator in the baseline regressions in Table 3. The results
are presented in Table A8 in Appendix D. The point estimate in the full specifica-
tion (column 3) is smaller than the coefficient reported in Table 3, but all results are
statistically significant at the conventional level. The evidence suggests that agency
story is relevant to the observed relation between wealth and performance. However,
the agency story can not explain the results completely.
Next I examine whether the observed results are driven by first-time CEOs or
seasoned CEOs. Board members are less likely to observe a candidate’s managerial
ability when he or she has no prior CEO experience; when they have limited informa-
tion about candidates, they tend to select a candidate to whom they have a personal
or professional connection. After hiring a CEO, the board updates its assessment of
the CEO’s ability when more information is revealed. The effectiveness of a board in
selecting a CEO increases when more public information about the manager’s per-
formance is available (i.e., when a candidate has prior CEO experience). Boards of
directors can learn from a seasoned CEO’s past performance and therefore select the
high type candidate.
I split the sample based on CEOs’ past experience. First-time CEOs are identi-
fied as chief executives without prior CEO experience. Seasoned CEOs are those with
CEO experience. The results are presented in Table 13. I find a negative relation
between family wealth and firm performance among first-time CEOs. However, such
relation doesn’t hold among seasoned CEOs. The empirical evidence is consistent
with the view that a board is less effective in choosing a CEO when there is asym-
metry of information. I further investigates the effectiveness of boards of directors
in monitoring CEOs and I focus on first-time CEOs because the wealth-performance
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effect is only observed among them. In this paper, I show that CEOs from wealthy
families are more likely to connect with board of directors. Social ties between a CEO
and board members might have mixed prediction for corporate governance. On one
hand, they might facilitate access to information. On the other hand, pre-existing so-
cial ties can diminish the effectiveness of corporate governance. To evaluate whether
a CEO’s endowed social status is associated with board effectiveness, I examine the
effects of CEOs’ endowed family wealth on the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm
performance. Following existing literature (Nguyen-Dang (2012)), I examine whether
the sensitivity of CEO turnover to prior performance varies with CEO’s family wealth
using a probit regression model. The dependent variable is a CEO turnover dummy,
which takes the value of one if there is a CEO turnover and equal to zero if there
is no CEO turnover. I use one year lagged ROA as the proxy for firm performance
and I further interact prior firm performance with the measure of the CEO’s fam-
ily wealth. The empirical results reported in Table A9 provide evidence that CEO
turnover is negatively related to firm performance. Further, I find that the coefficient
on the interaction of firm performance and family wealth is positive and statistically
significant, indicating that a CEO’s family wealth is negatively correlated with the
sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance. This result is consistent with the view
that CEOs from wealthy families are less likely to be dismissed for poor performance.
Overall, the results suggest that the effectiveness of board in selecting a CEO
is likely to be affected by its knowledge about the CEO’s ability. Underperforming
CEOs from wealthy families are less likely to be selected when adverse information
is possessed by the board.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION
This paper studies the relation between a CEO’s family wealth in his or her for-
mative years and the CEO’s managerial ability and style. By matching a CEO’s
place of residence in his or her formative years with U.S. Census survey data, I obtain
an estimate of the CEO’s family wealth. I find that, on average, CEOs born into
poor families outperform those born into wealthy families. My evidence is consistent
with the argument that less advantaged individuals face dramatically higher barriers
to entry into managerial positions and so that only the most skilled and motivated
candidates among them succeed.
The results are robust to controlling for a variety of CEO and firm-specific charac-
teristics and also to using several proxies for firm performance. The negative relation
between a CEO’s endowed social status and firm performance is stronger in firms
where a CEO’s human capital is more valuable, such as high-growth firms and multi-
segment firms, and is weaker in firms with larger managerial teams, which may dilute
the CEO’s influence on firm strategy and performance. However, CEOs from wealthy
families perform better than their peers from less wealthy families during periods of
economic policy uncertainty. The result is consistent with the view that CEOs from
wealthy families could add value to firms by obtaining private information from their
social contacts.
To shed light on mechanisms through which a CEO’s family wealth is associated
with firm performance. I show that CEOs with low family wealth offer greater job
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security to employees when their firms’ financial health deteriorates. These factors
motivate employees to invest more in the firm-specific human capital and to take on
more innovative projects.
The evidence in this paper might have implications for the debate on the effective-
ness of board of directors. My findings suggest that regulators consider both visible
and less observable governance features in setting disclosure rules. More broadly,
this paper provides guidance for policy makers to makes education more affordable
for general population, i.e., provide more merit-based scholarships. Access to elite
education might offer talented but less privileged individuals pathways to success.
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Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of CEOs’ Places of Residence During Their
Formative Years
The sample consists of 506 CEOs for whom I am able to estimate family wealth
in their formative years. See Chapter 3 for details on sample construction. For 358
CEOs with high school information, I calculate the CEO’s family wealth as the median
household income in the census tract located nearest to the CEO’s high school when
the CEO was 15 years old. The household income data are from the U.S. Census of
Population and Housing file. For 148 CEOs without high school information, I use
the median household income in the census tract nearest to the CEO’s place of birth.
Blue stars in the figure correspond to CEOs with family wealth estimates below the
median and red dots denote for CEOs with family wealth estimates above the median.23:31 Saturday, August 26, 2017 1
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Figure 2: Firm Characteristics Around CEO Turnover
The figure plots firm characteristics around CEO turnover. Year 0 refers to the
year of a new CEO’s appointment. Blue lines in the figure correspond to CEOs
with family wealth estimates below the sample median, and gray lines correspond
to CEOs with family wealth estimates above the sample median. Figure a refers
to the leverage dynamics around CEO turnover. Figure b refers to cash holdings
around CEO turnover. Figure c refers to equity volatility around CEO turnover.
Figure d stands for idiosyncratic volatility around CEO turnover. Figure e stands for
shareholder litigation around CEO turnover. Figure f stands for earnings restatements
around CEO turnover.
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Figure 2: Firm Characteristics Around CEO Turnover (continued)
The figure plots firm characteristics around CEO turnover. Year 0 refers to the
year of a new CEO’s appointment. Blue lines in the figure correspond to CEOs
with family wealth estimates below the sample median, and gray lines correspond
to CEOs with family wealth estimates above the sample median. Figure a refers
to the leverage dynamics around CEO turnover. Figure b refers to cash holdings
around CEO turnover. Figure c refers to equity volatility around CEO turnover.
Figure d stands for idiosyncratic volatility around CEO turnover. Figure e stands for
shareholder litigation around CEO turnover. Figure f stands for earnings restatements
around CEO turnover.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A reports summary statistics for CEO characteristics. The unit of observation
is firm-year. Family wealth (in $000’s) denotes the median household income of the
CEO’s place of residence at his or her formative year, adjusted for 1940 dollars.
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. P10 P50 P90
Panel A: CEO Characteristics
Family wealth (in $000’s) 4,231 3.066 2.764 1.403 2.590 4.602
Family wealth (Logarithm) 4,231 1.301 0.392 0.877 1.278 1.723
Family wealth 1940 (in $000’s) 710 2.336 1.588 0.65 1.944 5
Year of birth 4,231 1947 8.959 1937 1946 1960
CEO age 3,971 57.407 8.364 46 58 68
Female 4,231 0.035 0.184 0 0 0
Private high school 4,231 0.108 0.311 0 0 0
BA degree 4,231 0.93 0.255 1 1 1
MBA degree 4,231 0.323 0.468 0 0 1
Ph.D. degree 4,231 0.081 0.272 0 0 0
Ivy League school 4,231 0.294 0.456 0 0 1
Prior industry experience 4,231 0.197 0.398 0 0 1
Prior CEO experience 4,231 0.073 0.260 0 0 0
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (continued)
Panel B reports summary statistics for firm characteristics. The unit of observation
is firm-year. Family wealth (in $000’s) denotes the median household income of the
CEO’s place of residence at his or her formative year, adjusted for 1940 dollars.
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. P10 P50 P90
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Sales (in $ million) 5,216 11,253.4 23,907.8 314.9 2,444.9 28,356
Employees (in 000’s) 5,188 36.291 64.499 1.3 9.8 100.3
Firm age 5,216 26.363 20.891 6 20 60
Market-to-book 5,216 2.173 1.392 1.06 1.71 3.907
ROA 5,216 0.151 0.089 0.059 0.145 0.257
R&D expenses 5,216 0.04 0.072 0 0 0.151
Asset turnover 5,215 1.217 0.81 0.422 1.009 2.348
Leverage 5,216 0.216 0.175 0 0.197 0.451
Capital expenditures 5,216 0.055 0.052 0.01 0.038 0.115
M&A deal 3,692 0.148 0.571 0 0 0
CAR 546 -0.006 0.048 -0.061 -0.004 0.039
Earnings surprise 5,174 -0.000 0.027 -0.011 0.001 0.010
Stock return 5,216 0.159 0.469 -0.342 0.097 0.679
Relative stock return 5,216 -0.013 0.415 -0.454 -0.057 0.439
Volatility 5,216 0.409 0.192 0.213 0.364 0.663
Idiosyncratic volatility 5,216 0.351 0.174 0.173 0.313 0.580
Class action lawsuits 4,961 0.028 0.171 0 0 0
Earnings restatements 3,636 0.138 0.345 0 0 1
CEO-chair 3,923 0.489 0.5 0 0 1
Board independence 3,923 0.707 0.167 0.5 0.727 0.9
Board size 3,923 9.653 2.555 7 10 13
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Table 2: CEO Family Background and CEO Characteristics
This table reports summary statistics for the CEO’s family wealth, age, gender, and
education (Panel A), career advancement (Panel B), and connections to directors
(Panel C) for the sample of CEOs with high family wealth (those with family wealth
above the annual median) and CEOs with low family wealth(those with family wealth
below the annual median). The standard errors are clustered at the firm level, with
t-statistics reported in the table.
Low Family
Wealth
High Family
Wealth
Differences
in Means
t-stat
Panel A: CEO Characteristics
Family wealth (in $000’s) 1.891 4.544 -2.653∗∗∗ -8.71
CEO age 61.070 54.490 6.58∗∗∗ 8.72
Female 0.023 0.044 -0.021 -1.32
Private high school 0.066 0.146 -0.08∗∗ -2.53
BA degree 0.921 0.935 -0.014 -0.53
MBA degree 0.314 0.320 -0.016 -0.12
Ph.D. degree 0.092 0.067 0.025 0.89
Ivy League School 0.256 0.341 -0.085 ∗ 1.92
Panel B: CEO Career Advancement
Age to start a first job 27.199 25.838 1.361∗ 1.91
Age to start a first job in a public firm 36.169 32.264 3.905∗∗∗ 3.10
Age to become a CEO 52.596 46.515 6.081∗∗∗ 5.87
Panel C: CEO Connections to Directors
Connected to directors 0.172 0.202 -0.030∗∗∗ -2.77
Connected through employment 0.069 0.049 0.020∗∗∗ 2.79
Connected through education 0.009 0.014 -0.006∗∗ -2.51
Connected through social activities 0.113 0.154 -0.041∗∗∗ -4.64
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Table 3: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable
is ROA at the fiscal year-end. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit
SIC codes, are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.022*** -0.017** -0.018**
(-3.25) (-2.29) (-2.55)
High family wealth -0.011** -0.009* -0.012**
(-2.24) (-1.74) (-2.50)
Firm size 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.009***
(5.00) (5.27) (4.08) (4.81) (5.10) (3.93)
Market-to-book 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(12.46) (13.83) (14.15) (11.98) (13.47) (14.01)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(0.65) (0.39) (1.21) (1.19) (0.81) (1.69)
Leverage -0.039** -0.033** -0.016 -0.038** -0.032** -0.015
(-2.38) (-2.01) (-0.91) (-2.34) (-1.98) (-0.84)
R&D expenses -0.377*** -0.373*** -0.261*** -0.379*** -0.374*** -0.259***
(-3.15) (-2.95) (-3.17) (-3.09) (-2.90) (-3.17)
Capital expenditures 0.418*** 0.367*** 0.324*** 0.426*** 0.372*** 0.327***
(5.05) (5.93) (5.28) (5.09) (6.05) (5.36)
Female -0.007 -0.015 -0.007 -0.015
(-0.51) (-1.13) (-0.55) (-1.12)
Prior industry experience -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
(-0.23) (-0.49) (-0.11) (-0.36)
Prior CEO experience -0.034*** -0.026** -0.035*** -0.026**
(-3.36) (-2.47) (-3.42) (-2.50)
BA degree -0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.07) (0.11) (-0.24) (-0.05)
MBA degree 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.37) (0.62) (0.44) (0.68)
Ph.D. degree -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.003
(-0.14) (0.19) (0.02) (0.43)
CEO-Chair -0.001 -0.001
(-0.19) (-0.13)
Board independence 0.002 0.002
(0.14) (0.15)
Board size -0.016 -0.015
(-1.27) (-1.22)
Observations 4,225 4,050 3,059 4,225 4,050 3,059
R-squared 0.417 0.440 0.481 0.414 0.438 0.480
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Table 4: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance, 1940 Census
Sample
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent vari-
ables is ROA at the fiscal year-end. The sample consists of 108 CEOs with personal
household income in the 1940 U.S. Census report. Year and industry fixed effects,
defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in all specifications. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.027** -0.023** -0.037**
(-2.33) (-2.03) (-2.50)
High family wealth -0.028** -0.026** -0.036**
(-2.53) (-2.19) (-2.14)
Firm size 0.013** 0.009* 0.008 0.014** 0.010* 0.007
(2.49) (1.82) (0.91) (2.58) (1.95) (0.81)
Market-to-book 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.032*** 0.024***
(8.95) (8.27) (4.79) (9.25) (8.70) (5.18)
Firm age -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001**
(-1.92) (-2.89) (-2.36) (-1.95) (-2.96) (-2.31)
Leverage -0.041 -0.020 0.015 -0.041 -0.015 0.026
(-1.62) (-0.92) (0.42) (-1.62) (-0.67) (0.71)
R&D expenses -0.685*** -0.751*** -0.751*** -0.655*** -0.729*** -0.736***
(-4.63) (-5.54) (-5.61) (-4.44) (-5.36) (-5.33)
Capital expenditures 0.148 0.025 0.130 0.151 0.025 0.117
(1.45) (0.23) (1.00) (1.56) (0.23) (0.92)
Prior industry experience 0.009 0.026** 0.008 0.025**
(0.91) (2.05) (0.76) (2.17)
Prior CEO experience -0.048*** -0.069*** -0.048*** -0.073***
(-3.95) (-3.36) (-3.85) (-3.90)
BA degree 0.079*** 0.057** 0.072*** 0.057**
(4.31) (2.14) (3.77) (2.21)
MBA degree 0.020* 0.027** 0.023** 0.032**
(1.84) (2.09) (2.14) (2.30)
Ph.D. degree 0.045** 0.076*** 0.052** 0.086***
(2.08) (3.22) (2.26) (3.32)
CEO-Chair -0.022 -0.019
(-1.54) (-1.43)
Board independence -0.017 -0.001
(-0.69) (-0.05)
Board size -0.021 -0.020
(-1.01) (-1.04)
Observations 710 672 449 710 672 449
R-squared 0.609 0.661 0.708 0.613 0.666 0.712
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Table 5: Alternative Measures of Firm Performance
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variables
are asset turnover, earnings surprise, and relative stock return, respectively. Year
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Industry fixed effects, defined by two-
digit SIC codes, are included in all specifications except column (5) and (6). Standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Asset Turnover Earnings Surprise Relative Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.126* -0.002* -0.048***
(-1.85) (-1.72) (-2.77)
High family wealth -0.097** -0.001** -0.038***
(-2.00) (-1.97) (-2.78)
Log(Market Value) -0.098*** -0.098*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.011** 0.011**
(-5.05) (-5.01) (4.13) (4.31) (2.52) (2.41)
Market-to-book 0.037 0.038 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.074*** 0.075***
(1.51) (1.54) (-2.99) (-2.71) (8.74) (8.74)
Firm age 0.002 0.003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001** 0.001**
(1.13) (1.27) (2.78) (3.48) (2.12) (2.28)
Leverage -1.013*** -1.003*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.174*** -0.171***
(-4.77) (-4.71) (-5.74) (-5.16) (-3.17) (-3.12)
R&D expenses -2.982*** -2.944*** -0.019 -0.019 -1.293*** -1.293***
(-3.59) (-3.50) (-1.53) (-1.51) (-7.28) (-7.26)
Capital expenditures 1.781*** 1.812*** -0.017 -0.022* -0.638*** -0.619***
(3.86) (3.93) (-1.46) (-1.89) (-4.01) (-3.99)
Lagged volatility -0.170 -0.169 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.523*** 0.524***
(-1.33) (-1.32) (3.90) (4.04) (8.44) (8.44)
Sales growth 0.275*** 0.269*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.366*** 0.363***
(4.41) (4.28) (7.16) (6.89) (8.11) (8.04)
Female -0.203 -0.197 -0.001 -0.001 -0.051 -0.050
(-1.33) (-1.27) (-0.44) (-0.46) (-1.30) (-1.27)
Prior industry experience -0.045 -0.036 0.001 0.002* 0.033** 0.034**
(-0.81) (-0.67) (1.48) (1.96) (1.99) (2.06)
Prior CEO experience -0.105 -0.112* 0.000 -0.002 0.015 0.014
(-1.63) (-1.76) (0.44) (-0.81) (0.54) (0.48)
BA degree 0.074 0.063 -0.000 -0.001 0.058** 0.054**
(0.77) (0.67) (-0.41) (-0.71) (2.26) (2.13)
MBA degree -0.013 -0.006 0.000 -0.000 -0.005 -0.003
(-0.21) (-0.09) (0.10) (-0.14) (-0.31) (-0.19)
Ph.D. degree 0.015 0.022 -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.004
(0.15) (0.23) (-0.62) (-0.70) (-0.36) (-0.17)
Observations 3,881 3,881 3,863 3,863 3,628 3,628
R-squared 0.582 0.583 0.085 0.085 0.176 0.176
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Table 7: Heterogeneity by Firm Characteristics
This table reports how the effect of the CEO’s family wealth on firm ROA varies
with different characteristics. The control variables are the same as in Model 3 of
Table 3 (omitted here for brevity). Year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in all specifications
except column (4). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family wealth -0.013 0.012 -0.023** -0.012 -0.168**
(-1.11) (0.62) (-2.18) (-0.83) (-2.48)
R&D expenses*family wealth -0.260**
(-2.19)
Market-to-book*family wealth -0.017**
(-2.00)
Multi-segment firm*family wealth -0.051*
(-1.79)
Multi-segment firm 0.065*
(1.69)
High discretion*family wealth -0.051**
(-2.23)
High discretion industry 0.064**
(2.18)
Board size*family wealth 0.064**
(2.19)
R&D expenses 0.030 -0.285*** -0.293*** -0.292*** -0.287***
(0.22) (-5.41) (-5.57) (-4.99) (-5.62)
Market-to-book 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.034***
(14.87) (5.36) (14.75) (8.80) (14.72)
Board size -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 0.005 -0.092**
(-1.21) (-1.15) (-1.14) (0.33) (-2.47)
Observations 3,059 3,059 3,059 1,930 3,059
R-squared 0.500 0.501 0.498 0.432 0.500
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Table 9: Selection on Unobservables and the Omitted Variable Bias
This table reports δ, which measures the degree of omitted variable bias using the
test proposed by and developed by Oster (2017); δ > 1 (δ < 1) implies that selection
on unobservable variables must be greater (smaller) than selection on observable
variables in order to explain away the coefficient of interest by the omitted variable
bias. Each entry corresponds to a particular regression specification in Tables 3 and
Table 4. I calculate δ under the assumption of the maximum possible R-squared
suggested by Oster (2017), i.e., Rmax = 1.3R˜, where R˜ is the observed maximum
R-squared in the regression model, and under the more stringent assumption the
Rmax = 1.
Regression Specification
Input Rmax Explanatory Variable Table 3, Model 3 Table 4, Model 3
1.3R˜ Family wealth 18.705
1.3R˜ Family wealth 1940 5.922
1 Family wealth 5.325
1 Family wealth 1940 3.927
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Table 11: CEO Family Background and Firm Risk
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variables
are measures for a variety of corporate outcomes. Year and industry fixed effects,
defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in all specifications. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Leverage Volatility
Idiosyncratic
volatility
Class action
lawsuits
Earnings
restatements
Family wealth 0.010 0.025* 0.026** 0.145 0.018
(0.59) (1.96) (2.28) (1.11) (0.09)
Log(Market Value) -0.009 -0.026*** -0.029*** 0.097** -0.108**
(-1.58) (-6.62) (-8.06) (2.11) (-1.99)
Market-to-book -0.020*** 0.010** 0.008** -0.036 -0.013
(-3.17) (2.21) (2.01) (-0.73) (-0.18)
Sales growth 0.050** -0.062*** -0.041*** -0.522* 0.024
(2.41) (-3.51) (-2.60) (-1.79) (0.10)
Firm age 0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 0.001
(2.46) (-4.29) (-3.98) (-0.48) (0.43)
Leverage 0.030 0.031 0.122 -0.442
(0.94) (1.09) (0.38) (-1.05)
Female -0.031 0.006 0.012 -0.275 -0.191
(-0.82) (0.12) (0.26) (-0.72) (-0.75)
Prior industry experience 0.028* 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.047
(1.77) (0.77) (0.33) (-0.01) (-0.25)
Prior CEO experience 0.003 0.030* 0.035** -0.119 -0.007
(0.10) (1.77) (2.24) (-0.54) (-0.03)
BA degree 0.048* -0.002 -0.004 -0.117 0.005
(1.85) (-0.13) (-0.25) (-0.59) (0.02)
MBA degree -0.002 -0.005 -0.004 0.045 -0.011
(-0.11) (-0.44) (-0.38) (0.41) (-0.08)
Ph.D. degree 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 0.069 -0.315
(0.34) (-0.05) (-0.23) (0.39) (-1.08)
CEO-Chair -0.005 0.012 0.014* 0.039 -0.095
(-0.45) (1.45) (1.90) (0.29) (-0.76)
Board independence 0.083** 0.031 0.024 0.098 -0.481
(1.98) (1.07) (0.94) (0.29) (-1.14)
Board size 0.121*** -0.055** -0.050** 0.196 -0.305
(4.17) (-2.57) (-2.56) (0.72) (-0.95)
Observations 3,064 3,064 3,064 2,362 2,106
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared 0.375 0.563 0.571 0.098 0.156
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Table 12: CEO Family Background and Managerial Style
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variables
are the natural log of the number of patent applications, the natural log of citations
, and employee turnover. Included controls in Panel B are as follows: Columns 1
to 4: firm size, market-to-book ratio, sales growth, leverage, cash holdings, female,
prior industry experience, prior CEO experience, BA degree, MBA degree, and Ph.D.
degree. Columns 5 and 6: lagged firm size, lagged market-to-book ratio, lagged
leverage, female, prior industry experience, prior CEO experience, BA degree, MBA
degree, and Ph.D. degree. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC
codes, are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Log(Patents) Log(Citations) Employee
Turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth 0.895∗
(1.97)
1.532∗∗∗
(2.79)
0.011
(0.86)
High family wealth 0.434∗∗
(2.40)
0.612∗∗∗
(2.82)
0.013∗∗
(2.13)
R&D expenses*family wealth -3.971∗
(-1.76)
-9.245∗
(-1.75)
R&D expenses*high family
wealth
-4.261∗
(-1.72)
-3.568
(-1.21)
R&D expenses 9.671∗∗∗
(4.58)
8.236∗∗∗
(4.83)
17.615∗∗∗
(2.64)
8.452∗∗∗
(3.27)
ROAt−1*family wealth -0.124∗∗
(-2.07)
ROAt−1*high family wealth -0.058∗
(-1.89)
ROAt−1 -0.813
(-1.08)
-0.891
(-1.17)
-1.429
(-1.49)
-1.369
(-1.46)
0.071
(0.90)
-0.051∗
(-1.92)
Observations 1,035 1,035 957 957 4,045 4,045
R-squared 0.734 0.734 0.710 0.710 0.108 0.108
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Table 13: First-time CEOs and Seasoned CEOs
This table reports OLS regression estimates on the relation between CEO family
wealth and firm performance. The sample is split in two. First-time CEOs are CEOs
without prior CEO experience. Seasoned CEOs are those who had CEO experience.
Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in all
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
First-time CEOs Seasoned CEOs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.020** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.011 -0.004 -0.005
(-2.56) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-0.44) (-0.19) (-0.24)
Firm size 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.010*
(4.29) (4.38) (3.29) (4.36) (4.07) (1.82)
Market-to-book 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.032***
(13.72) (13.87) (13.26) (4.57) (5.02) (5.53)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.001* 0.000
(0.40) (0.34) (0.93) (1.92) (1.70) (1.26)
Leverage -0.031* -0.030 -0.014 -0.062* -0.056 -0.029
(-1.75) (-1.65) (-0.67) (-1.80) (-1.59) (-0.98)
R&D expenses -0.240** -0.214** -0.228*** -0.621** -0.640** -0.231
(-2.38) (-2.27) (-2.62) (-2.23) (-2.35) (-0.99)
Capital expenditures 0.277*** 0.275*** 0.265*** 0.683*** 0.683*** 0.521***
(4.32) (4.29) (4.38) (4.11) (4.08) (2.73)
Female -0.005 -0.009 -0.027 -0.054
(-0.39) (-0.73) (-0.79) (-1.50)
Prior industry experience -0.011 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004
(-1.46) (-1.12) (-0.10) (-0.27)
BA degree -0.006 -0.007 -0.004 0.004
(-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.16) (0.16)
MBA degree 0.002 0.003 -0.005 -0.006
(0.32) (0.63) (-0.37) (-0.42)
Ph.D. degree -0.010 -0.002 0.010 0.022
(-1.01) (-0.19) (0.54) (1.48)
CEO-Chair -0.007 0.021**
(-1.28) (2.22)
Board independence -0.002 -0.001
(-0.14) (-0.02)
Board size -0.012 -0.025
(-0.89) (-0.95)
Observations 3,139 3,139 2,431 911 911 628
R-squared 0.432 0.435 0.472 0.596 0.599 0.611
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A potential problem with my sampling strategy concerns the coverage of CEO bi-
ographies in public sources, such as the Lexis Nexis database. One might reasonably
expect CEOs of larger and more prominent firms to garner greater public interest and
therefore to be more likely to be included in public databases. While my estimation
controls for firm size and other firm characteristics, a particular concern in my setting
is that CEOs of poorly performing firms are more likely to be omitted from public
databases if they are also born into poor families. To obtain a more representative
sample, I supplement the data collection with birth certificates and high school year-
books from the interface provided by ancestry.com. However, I observe that CEOs
of larger and more profitable firms are more likely to be covered in public data sources.
To assess the importance of sample selection bias for my results, I implement the
two-stage sample selection model of Heckman (1979). In the first stage, I estimate
a probit model predicting the likelihood of the entity selecting into my sample. The
dependent variable in this model is equal to 1 if a CEO is included in my main sample
(i.e., he or she is one of 506 CEOs for whom I observe family wealth) and 0 if a CEO
drops out of my sample. My initial sample consisted of 2,137 unique CEOs. After
excluding 1,631 CEOs who were foreign-born and for whom the estimates of endowed
family wealth were not available, my final sample consisted of 506 CEOs. The inde-
pendent variables are firm size, market-to-book ratio, R&D expenses, and CEO age.
In the second stage, I include the inverse Mills ratio computed from the first-stage
model to control for sample selection bias. Specifically, I replicate the models in Table
3, but include the inverse Mills ratio as a control variable. In both stages, I include
industry and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The first- and second- stage equations share the same predictors, The predicted
value from the first-stage regression correlates strongly with the control variables in
the second stage model, and high collinearity could yield inconsistent estimates. To
alleviate the potential concern about high collinearity, I introduce an instrumental
variable to the estimation. It is a dummy variable (Before 1940 ) that takes the value
of 1 if the CEOs in the pool were born before 1940, and 0 otherwise. This instrument
variable should influence the selection into the sample because individual records from
the U.S. Census Survey are available for CEOs born before 1940; these provide more
demographic information such as parents names, home address, and birth date. It is
useful to link the information available from different public resources. Thus the like-
lihood of CEOs born before 1940 selecting into the sample condition is high; however,
the dummy Before 1940 is unlikely to correlate with firm performance, which sug-
gests that it might be a valid instrumental variable. I apply the two-stage Heckman
correction model by including the exclusion restriction variable in the first stage. The
results are reported in Table A2 in Appendix D. The results show that the coefficients
for the inverse Mills ratio are not statistically different from zero and the coefficients
on family wealth are of similar magnitude and significance as those reported in Table
3, suggesting that sample selection is not important.
Overall, these results suggest that the sample selection bias is unlikely to affect
the observed relation between CEOs’ endowed family wealth and firm performance.
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I construct an alternative measure of CEOs endowed family wealth. For each of
the 358 CEOs in my sample whose high school yearbook is available, I match the city
of the high school that the CEO attended with the nearest city level U.S. Census file.
The family wealth is estimated as the median household income of the city. For 148
CEOs with missing high school yearbooks, I assume they continue to reside in their
formative years in the same city they were born.
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Panel A: CEO Characteristics
Variable Description
Family wealth The logarithm of one plus the median household income in
the census tract that a CEO resided in his or her formative
years, adjusted for 1940 dollars.
High family wealth An indicator variable equal to 1 if Family Wealth is above
the annual median, 0 otherwise.
Family wealth 1940 The logarithm of one plus the total household income of
the CEO’s family in 1940 (1940 Census record).
High family wealth
1940
An indicator equal to 1 if Family Wealth 1940 is above the
annual median, 0 otherwise.
Prior industry experi-
ence
An indicator equal to 1 if the CEO has worked in in pub-
licly traded firms in the same industry (two-digit SIC) , 0
otherwise. (BoardEx).
Prior CEO experience An indicator equal to 1 if the individual has a prior CEO
experience , 0 otherwise. (BoardEx).
Age CEO’s age at the end of fiscal year (Execucomp).
Female An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is a female,
0 otherwise (Execucomp).
BA degree An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a BA college
degree or equivalent, 0 otherwise (BoardEx).
MBA degree An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO has an MBA
degree, 0 otherwise (BoardEx).
Ph.D. degree An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO has a Ph.D.
degree, 0 otherwise (BoardEx).
Ivy League school An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO attended an
Ivy League school (Brown University, Columbia Univer-
sity, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard Uni-
versity, Princeton University, University of Pennsylvania,
and Yale University) at any academic level, 0 otherwise
(BoardEx).
Private high school An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO attended a
private high school, 0 otherwise.
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Panel B: Firm Characteristics
Variable Description
Firm size The logarithm of the firm’s sales (Compustat).
Firm age The number of years since the first date of the firm’s in-
corporation. (Compustat).
ROA Operating income before depreciation scaled by the book
assets (Compustat).
Asset turnover The firm’s sales scaled by the book assets (Compustat).
Leverage Total book debt scaled by the book assets (Compustat).
Capital expenditures Net capital expenditures scaled by the book assets (Com-
pustat).
Market-to-book Market value of assets scaled by the book assets (Compu-
stat).
R&D expenses Research and development expenses scaled by the book
assets (Compustat).
M&A deal The number of M&A deals announced by the firm during
the fiscal year
CAR The acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return over the win-
dow (-1,+1) around the merger announcement based on
the market model
Multi-segment firm Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm has more
than one business segment, and zero otherwise (Compus-
tat).
Earnings surprise Earnings per share before extraordinary items minus ad-
justed earnings per share in the last period, scaled by the
price per share (Compustat).
Stock return The annualized stock return from the CRSP daily file over
the period (t-365,t-28)
Relative stock return The residuals from regressing the firm stock return on the
value weighted industry stock return. Industries are de-
fined using two-digit SIC code
High policy uncer-
tainty
Dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm is in the
top 25% of the distribution of the BBD index.
Volatility The standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over
the period (t-365,t-28)
Idiosyncratic volatil-
ity
The standard deviation of the residuals from regressing the
firm’s daily stock return on the market model over the pe-
riod (t-365,t-28)
Class action lawsuit The number of shareholder litigation of which a firm is a
target during the fiscal year
Earnings restatement An indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm revises earnings
during the fiscal year
CEO-chair An indicator variable equal to 1 if CEO is the chairman of
the board, 0 otherwise (BoardEx).
Board size The logarithm of the number of directors on the board
(BoardEx).
Board independence The number of independent directors divided by the total
number of all directors (BoardEx).
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Table A1: Correlation Between Family Wealth Estimates and CEO Edu-
cation
Family wealth Family wealth 1940
Family wealth 1940 0.329***
Private high school 0.158*** 0.156***
BA degree 0.072*** 0.164***
MBA degree -0.007 0.194***
Ivy League school 0.151*** 0.240***
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Table A2: Two-Stage Heckman Selection Model
This table shows the results of the estimation of the two-stage Heckman selection
model. Before 1940 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the CEO was
born before 1940, and 0 otherwise. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-
digit SIC codes, are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Probability of Selection ROA
Before 1940 0.771***
(3.06)
Inverse Mills ratio 0.001 0.005 0.003
(0.16) (0.38) (0.22)
Family wealth -0.021*** -0.015** -0.015**
(-2.86) (-2.05) (-2.10)
Firm size 0.421*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(10.15) (3.34) (3.10) (2.79)
Market-to-book 0.049 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034***
(1.56) (12.09) (12.38) (12.07)
Firm age 0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(1.15) (0.21) (-0.18) (-0.07)
Leverage -0.017 -0.034* -0.031 -0.029
(-0.06) (-1.69) (-1.62) (-1.51)
R&D expenses 3.439*** -0.306*** -0.291*** -0.299***
(3.13) (-3.32) (-2.94) (-3.02)
Capital expenditures -1.092 0.242*** 0.258*** 0.256***
(-1.22) (3.16) (3.40) (3.38)
Female 1.165*** 0.001 -0.001
(3.62) (0.07) (-0.08)
CEO age -0.401*** 0.006 0.007
(-7.36) (1.39) (1.49)
CEO age squared 0.004*** -0.000 -0.000
(7.72) (-1.10) (-1.20)
BA degree -0.130 0.005 0.006
(-0.94) (0.54) (0.60)
MBA degree -0.052 0.001 0.001
(-0.49) (0.14) (0.22)
Ph.D. degree 0.033 -0.001 -0.001
(0.17) (-0.10) (-0.13)
CEO-chair 0.194** -0.005
(2.42) (-0.78)
Board independence 0.062 -0.003
(0.21) (-0.17)
Board size -0.140 -0.013
(-0.66) (-0.86)
Observations 9,869 2,318 2,318 2,318
R-squared 0.481 0.489 0.491
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Table A3: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance - Alternative
Measure
Panel A reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable
is ROA at the fiscal year-end. Family wealth is defined as the the logarithm of one
plus the median household income of the city a CEO resided in his or her formative
years. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included
in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(-2.75) (-2.65) (-2.78)
High family wealth -0.011** -0.011** -0.014***
(-2.20) (-2.09) (-2.86)
Firm size 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.009***
(4.84) (5.11) (3.99) (4.76) (5.04) (3.91)
Market-to-book 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.034***
(13.15) (13.70) (14.08) (12.95) (13.53) (14.04)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*
(1.12) (0.81) (1.62) (1.20) (0.90) (1.80)
Leverage -0.033** -0.033** -0.016 -0.032** -0.032** -0.015
(-2.00) (-2.02) (-0.92) (-1.97) (-1.98) (-0.87)
R&D expenses -0.365*** -0.363*** -0.254*** -0.373*** -0.372*** -0.256***
(-2.96) (-2.89) (-3.19) (-2.94) (-2.90) (-3.15)
Capital expenditures 0.380*** 0.365*** 0.318*** 0.388*** 0.373*** 0.327***
(6.16) (5.95) (5.19) (6.32) (6.12) (5.41)
Female -0.005 -0.013 -0.007 -0.013
(-0.38) (-0.99) (-0.48) (-1.03)
Prior industry experience 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.02) (-0.27) (-0.10) (-0.43)
Prior CEO experience -0.035*** -0.026** -0.035*** -0.025**
(-3.41) (-2.55) (-3.38) (-2.42)
BA degree -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000
(-0.06) (0.10) (-0.17) (0.02)
MBA degree 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.46) (0.72) (0.44) (0.65)
Ph.D. degree -0.002 0.001 -0.000 0.002
(-0.18) (0.13) (-0.04) (0.27)
CEO-Chair -0.001 -0.001
(-0.24) (-0.18)
Board independence 0.005 0.004
(0.29) (0.22)
Board size -0.015 -0.015
(-1.24) (-1.24)
Observations 4,225 4,050 3,059 4,225 4,050 3,059
R-squared 0.431 0.440 0.481 0.429 0.439 0.482
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Table A3: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance - Alternative
Measure (continued)
Panel B reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variables
are asset turnover, earnings surprise, and relative stock return, respectively. Family
wealth is defined as the the logarithm of one plus the median household income of the
city a CEO resided in his or her formative years. Year fixed effects are included in all
specifications. Industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in
all specifications except column (7) and (8). Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel B
Asset Turnover Earnings Surprise Relative Return
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.304*** -0.002 -0.070**
(-2.76) (-1.42) (-2.48)
High family wealth -0.129*** -0.001** -0.034**
(-2.78) (-1.97) (-2.56)
Log(Market Value) -0.097*** -0.096*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.010** 0.010**
(-5.04) (-5.01) (4.15) (4.31) (2.38) (2.40)
Market-to-book 0.038 0.039 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(1.55) (1.58) (-2.99) (-2.71) (8.75) (8.82)
Firm age 0.003 0.003 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001** 0.001**
(1.32) (1.30) (2.97) (3.48) (2.28) (2.31)
Leverage -0.999*** -0.987*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.171*** -0.169***
(-4.74) (-4.69) (-5.68) (-5.16) (-3.10) (-3.07)
R&D expenses -2.827*** -2.919*** -0.018 -0.019 -1.274*** -1.288***
(-3.51) (-3.53) (-1.46) (-1.51) (-7.31) (-7.29)
Capital expenditures 1.756*** 1.846*** -0.017 -0.022* -0.624*** -0.609***
(3.83) (4.02) (-1.51) (-1.89) (-3.96) (-3.93)
Lagged volatility -0.153 -0.144 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.525*** 0.528***
(-1.20) (-1.13) (3.95) (4.04) (8.46) (8.46)
Sales growth 0.278*** 0.263*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.365*** 0.362***
(4.42) (4.13) (7.17) (6.89) (8.04) (8.02)
Female -0.170 -0.177 -0.001 -0.001 -0.047 -0.047
(-1.09) (-1.13) (-0.32) (-0.46) (-1.15) (-1.16)
Prior industry experience -0.028 -0.034 0.002** 0.002* 0.037** 0.034**
(-0.52) (-0.62) (2.01) (1.96) (2.25) (2.09)
Prior CEO experience -0.105 -0.113* -0.002 -0.002 0.014 0.014
(-1.65) (-1.77) (-0.87) (-0.81) (0.49) (0.49)
BA degree 0.077 0.069 -0.001 -0.001 0.056** 0.055**
(0.80) (0.72) (-0.50) (-0.71) (2.21) (2.14)
MBA degree -0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.05) (-0.04) (0.30) (-0.14) (-0.10) (-0.08)
Ph.D. degree 0.009 0.020 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004
(0.09) (0.20) (-0.65) (-0.70) (-0.34) (-0.18)
Observations 3,881 3,881 3,863 3,863 3,628 3,628
R-squared 0.585 0.585 0.085 0.085 0.175 0.175
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Table A5: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance - State Fixed
Effects
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable is
ROA at the fiscal year-end. Family wealth is defined as the the logarithm of one plus
the median household income of the city a CEO resided in his or her formative years.
State, year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in
all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family wealth -0.021*** -0.016* -0.019**
(-2.95) (-1.88) (-2.48)
High family wealth -0.011** -0.010* -0.013**
(-2.10) (-1.70) (-2.54)
Firm size 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.013***
(5.43) (5.76) (5.21) (5.28) (5.61) (5.12)
Market-to-book 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.034***
(12.95) (14.46) (14.07) (12.65) (14.28) (13.95)
Firm age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.29) (0.05) (0.63) (0.76) (0.39) (1.06)
Leverage -0.041** -0.032** -0.017 -0.041** -0.032** -0.016
(-2.48) (-2.02) (-0.97) (-2.47) (-2.00) (-0.91)
R&D expenses -0.314*** -0.309** -0.201** -0.316*** -0.308** -0.196**
(-2.74) (-2.57) (-2.26) (-2.69) (-2.51) (-2.22)
Capital expenditures 0.402*** 0.353*** 0.309*** 0.410*** 0.358*** 0.314***
(4.97) (5.69) (5.02) (5.04) (5.83) (5.14)
Female -0.005 -0.015 -0.006 -0.015
(-0.39) (-1.10) (-0.42) (-1.07)
Prior industry experience -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.005
(-0.28) (-0.83) (-0.16) (-0.68)
Prior CEO experience -0.033*** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.023**
(-3.27) (-2.04) (-3.38) (-2.11)
BA degree -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007
(-0.63) (-0.42) (-0.80) (-0.60)
MBA degree 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.18) (0.55) (0.27) (0.63)
Ph.D. degree -0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.003
(-0.31) (0.16) (-0.15) (0.39)
CEO-Chair -0.002 -0.001
(-0.34) (-0.29)
Board independence 0.008 0.009
(0.50) (0.55)
Board size -0.027** -0.027**
(-2.22) (-2.19)
Observations 4,225 4,050 3,059 4,225 4,050 3,059
R-squared 0.447 0.470 0.508 0.445 0.469 0.508
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Table A6: CEO and Firm Characteristics around CEO Turnover
This table reports summary statistics for firm characteristics one year prior to the
CEO appointment (Panel A) and measures of firm risk one year after the CEO ap-
pointment (Panel B). Family wealth denotes the natural logarithm of the median
household income of the CEO’s place of residence in his or her formative years, ad-
justed for 1940 dollars. High family wealth (low family wealth) refers to the sample
of CEOs with family wealth above (below) the annual median.
Low Family
Wealth
High Family
Wealth
Difference
in Means
t-stat
Panel A: Firm Characteristics One Year Before the CEO’s Appointment
Sales (in $ million) 6435.31 8246.69 -1811.38 -1.08
Market-to-book 2.15 2.63 -0.48 -2.33
Leverage 0.24 0.20 0.04 2.11
Capital expenditures 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.47
R&D expenses 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -2.94
ROA 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.47
Asset turnover 1.29 1.19 0.10 1.20
Panel B: Firm Risk One Year After the CEO’s Appointment
Stock return volatility 0.43 0.47 -0.03 -1.50
Idiosyncratic volatility 0.39 0.41 -0.02 -1.07
Class action lawsuits 0.05 0.14 -0.09 -1.65
Earnings restatements 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
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Table A7: External Recruitment vs. Internal Promotion
This table reports probit regressions for the choice of CEO promotion. The dependent
variable takes the value of one if a CEO is recruited exernally and zero if he or she is
promoted internally. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes,
are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-
statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Probit
Family wealth 0.859*
(1.87)
Firm size -0.441***
(-4.39)
Market-to-book -0.167*
(-1.78)
Firm age 0.031***
(3.12)
Leverage 2.727**
(2.48)
Cash flow 1.226
(0.90)
R&D expenses 5.846*
(1.74)
Female 1.298*
(1.94)
CEO age 0.063***
(3.10)
Prior industry experience -0.171
(-0.59)
Prior CEO experience 1.081***
(3.17)
BA degree 0.788
(1.28)
MBA degree 0.347
(1.22)
Ph.D. degree 0.682*
(1.67)
Observations 190
Pseudo R-squared 0.375
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Table A8: CEO Family Background and Firm Performance - Do Connec-
tions Matter?
This table reports OLS regression estimates of models where the dependent variable
is ROA at the fiscal year-end, with controlling for a CEO’s prior connections with the
nomination committee. Connection is a dummy variable which takes one if the CEO
is connected with the committee member through prior education or employment.
Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included in all
specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Family wealth -0.022** -0.020** -0.016*
(-2.41) (-2.15) (-1.77)
Firm size 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010***
(3.66) (3.89) (3.09)
Market-to-book 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.033***
(9.68) (10.58) (10.50)
Firm age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-0.88) (-0.78) (-1.23)
Leverage -0.044** -0.038* -0.034
(-2.05) (-1.81) (-1.41)
R&D expenses -0.486** -0.492** -0.239**
(-2.32) (-2.32) (-2.02)
Capital expenditures 0.389*** 0.359*** 0.277***
(4.80) (4.50) (3.59)
Connection 0.007 0.005 0.011
(0.96) (0.69) (1.50)
Female -0.013 -0.010
(-0.70) (-0.51)
Prior industry experience -0.001 -0.006
(-0.17) (-0.66)
Prior CEO experience -0.042*** -0.040**
(-3.01) (-2.44)
BA degree -0.007 -0.005
(-0.57) (-0.43)
MBA degree -0.002 -0.001
(-0.28) (-0.08)
Ph.D. degree 0.006 0.000
(0.51) (0.04)
CEO-Chair -0.001
(-0.12)
Board independence -0.007
(-0.30)
Board size -0.017
(-1.00)
Observations 2,565 2,551 1,938
R-squared 0.463 0.477 0.517
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Table A9: Firm Performance and CEO Turnover
This table reports probit regression for the relation between the probability of CEO
turnovers and prior firm performance. The sample includes CEOs who have no prior
CEO experience. The dependent variable is the CEO turnover dummy, which takes
the value of one if there is a CEO turnover and equal to zero if there is no CEO
turnover. The independent variables are measured as of one year prior to the CEO
turnover. Year and industry fixed effects, defined by two-digit SIC codes, are included
in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Probit
Family wealth -0.280
(-1.00)
ROA -3.394*
(-1.76)
ROA * Family wealth 2.354*
(1.67)
Firm size -0.038
(-1.11)
Market-to-book -0.009
(-0.15)
Sales growth -0.208
(-0.75)
Leverage 0.873**
(2.22)
CEO age 0.144***
(2.89)
CEO age squared -0.001**
(-2.30)
CEO-Chair -0.126
(-1.14)
Board independence 0.173
(0.46)
Board size 0.484**
(2.10)
Observations 1,695
Pseudo R-squared 0.097
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